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"LIBEL-BY-EXTRINSICACT"
Harry G. Henn',
BIRTHS

OBITUARIES

Mr. and Mrs. John E. Smith,
of 102 Hunt Lane, yesterday became the parents of twin sons.
Mrs. Smith is the former ....

The Rev. Robert J. Brown, 48,
pastor of the First Church, was
found dead late last evening at 25
Bomery Street ....

ENGAGEMENTS

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Mr. and Mrs. James R. Black,
of 83 Central Place, have announced the engagement of their
daughter, Eloise Joanne, to Mr.
Philip F. Jones, son of ....

Dear Editor:
Our county would be much
better off if Richard B. Davis,
County Budget Director, retired.
He is near retirement age, parsimonious with public funds, unprogressive, and has allowed only
token salary increments to county
employees ....
Very truly yours,
William C. Johnson

ADVERTISEMENT

These progressive dealers sell
Five-Star (*****) Bacon in the
new plastic carton:
Jeremy Straus Market
High-Grade Products, Inc.

On their face, all of the foregoing items appear rather commonplace,
innocent, and nondefamatory. However, by reference to certain facts
extrinsic to the published matter, each could be capable of a defamatory
meaning highly injurious to reputation.
If, in the case of the birth notice, the Smiths (assuming that they had
not become parents) had been married only a short time, that extrinsic
fact would render the published item defamatory because of its suggestion of their premarital intercourse.1
With respect to the engagement notice, even if the announcement were
made by the Blacks, and if Jones had in fact proposed to Eloise Joanne
and been accepted, and if Jones were in fact already married, the published item along with such extrinsic fact could defame the existing Mrs.
Jones by charging that she had cohabited with Mr. Jones other than as
his lawful wife.2
* @ Copyright 1961 by Harry G. Henn. The material in this article will form part of
a chapter in a forthcoming text on the law of libel and slander. The text is being prepared
under a grant from Frank E. Gannett Newspaper Foundation, Inc. which of course, is not
responsible for the views expressed in this article. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Irving P. Fox, of the New York Bar, who prepared the research analyses of
the New York Court of Appeals cases, and also the assistance of Thomas G. Rickert, of
the New York Bar, during their periods at the Cornell Law School.
T See contributors' section, masthead p. 69 for biographical data.
1 Cf. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 4 Sess. Cas. 5th Ser. 645, 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902);
see also Woods v. Edinburgh Evening News, Ltd., 47 Scot. L. Rep. 786 (1910). See notes
147-150 infra.
2 Cf. Cassidy v. Daly Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. (1929] 2 K.B. 331, 69 A.L.R. 720, infra
notes 144 and 150. Sydney v. Macfadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 151
14
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The advertisement, innocent on its face, would defame Jeremy Straus
in his business if, by way of extrinsic facts, he were a kosher meat dealer
whose dealing in nonkosher meat products such as bacon would violate
the tenets of the Orthodox Jewish faith. 3
The obituary notice appears highly innocent since defamation of the
,dead gives rise to no civil liability, 4 and even to write falsely that a person is dead has been held not to be defamatory.5 However, if the Rev.
Robert J. Brown had not been found dead at 25 Bomery Street, and if
that address-by way of extrinsic fact-were the address of a house of
ill-repute, a defamatory charge that the clergyman visited such house for
pleasure could be made out.6
On its face, the letter to the editor does not appear to libel William C.
Johnson. However, if (assuming the criticisms of the budget director
were not justified and Johnson did not write the letter) Johnson were a
confidential assistant to the budget director-a fact extrinsic to the published item-the false attribution of authorship to him of such a letter
unjustly criticizing his superior might defame him by impugning his
fitness as a confidential assistant to the budget director.
Published written matter, innocent on its face, when coupled with extrinsic facts which render it defamatory, may in some jurisdictions constitute actionable libel. In other jurisdictions, courts may impose an additional requirement-sometimes called the "libel-by-extrinsic-fact rule"
-that in such cases special damages must be alleged and proved. Frequently applied or misapplied in several American jurisdictions, the
"libel-by-extrinsic-fact rule" has been called "clearly contrary to the
N.E. 209 (1926), 44 A.L.R. 1419, and notes 103-108 infra; Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581,
142 N.E. 292 (1923), and notes 101, 102 infra; see also Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan.
783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959); Henry v. New York Post, Inc., 280 N.Y. 842, 21 N.E.2d 887
(1939), and note 109 infra.
3 Cf. Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930), and notes 110-112
infra.
4 Hughes v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 312 Mass. 178, 43 N.E.2d 657
(1942); Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 284 N.Y. 335, 31 N.E.2d 182 (1940), 132 A.L.R. 888,
40 Colum. L. Rev. 1267 (1940), 26 Cornell L.Q. 732 (1941), 10 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1941),
16 Ind. L.J. 595 (1941), 21 Ore. L. Rev. 309 (1942), 15 Temp. L.Q. 560 (1941), 19 Texas
L. Rev. 515 (1941). But see Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2 (1960) (libel defined to include
"malicious defamation . . . tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead. . . ."). 3
Restatement, Torts § 560 (1938); Armstrong, "Nothing But Good of the Dead?," 18
A.B.A.J. 229 (1932); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 739 (1943). Criminal libel of the dead is, of
course, possible in many jurisdictions.
5 Lemmer v. The Tribune, 50 Mont. 559, 148 Pac. 338 (1915); Cohen v. New York
Times Co., 153 App. Div. 242, 138 N.Y. Supp. 206 (2d Dep't 1912).
6 Cf. Quinn v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 55 Misc. 572, 105 N.Y. Supp. 1092 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1907), aff'd mem., 125 App. 900, 109 N.Y. Supp. 1143 (4th Dep't
1908).
7 Cf. Shoolman v. Gannett Co., Cal. Ck. No. 59-582, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Monroe County,
Feb. 4, 5, 8, 1960 (Macken, J.) (jury verdict of no cause of action) ; see also Van Heusen v.
Argenteau, 194 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E. 437 (1909).
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historical rule,"'8 a "peculiar departure from the common law,"' and a
"new creature... that... is ugly and illegitimate and ought promptly
to be strangled."' 0 The rule is not recognized by the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS."1

Among the jurisdictions which do recognize the rule is New York,
which, despite being one of the pioneers in promoting the rule and con-,
sidering it in a series of leading cases, has yet to define its scope.
Any sound review of the cases propounding the rule requires an understanding of certain traditional principles of defamation law and the traditional meanings, within the context of such principles, of certain terms
used in defamation law.
TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES AND TERMINOLOGY OF DEFAMATION LAW

For over two centuries now,'2 defamation has been classified as either
slander or libel, such classification depending upon the form of publication of the defamatory matter.'" As a general rule, slander is actionable
8 1 Harper & James, Torts 373 n. 9 (1956).

9 Prosser, Torts 588 (2d ed. 1955).
1o Carpenter, "Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States," 17 So. Cal. L. Rev.
347 (1944).
11 3 Restatement, Torts § 569 (1938). At least the Restatement, which discusses "extrinsic circumstances" under meaning of the communication (§ 563, comment e), has been
so characterized. Prosser, "Libel Per Quod," 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 843 (1960). Dean Prosser,
as Reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts, has the following re-restatement under
consideration:
§ 569. Liability Without Proof of Special Harm.
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without proof of
special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is
(a) Libel whose defamatory meaning is apparent from the publication itself without
reference to extrinsic facts, or
(b) Libel or slander which imputes to another
(i) A criminal offense, as stated in § 571,
(ii) A loathsome disease, as stated in § 572,
(iii) Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office, as stated in
§ 573, or
(iv) Unchastity on the part of a woman, as stated in § 574.
(2) One who publishes any other libel or slander is subject to liability only upon
proof of special harm, as stated in § 575.
Prosser, supra note 9, 593.
In so doing, Dean Prosser suggests that the present Restatement rule is "out of date;"
quaere, on the basis of many of the cases cited by Dean Prossner, whether it was not out
of date when published in 1938, and whether his proposed rule is a more accurate restatement. See notes 128, 136, 140 infra.
12 See Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812); Comment,
"The Pre-Thorley-Kerry Case Law of the Libel-Slander Distinction," 23 U. Chi. L. Rev.
132 (1955). But see Grein v. La Poma, 54 Wash. 2d 844, 340 P.2d 766 (1959), 14 Ark. L.
Rev. 353 (1960), 28 Fordham L. Rev. 852 (1959-60), 33 So. Cal. L. Rev. 104 (1959), 11
Syracuse L. Rev. 119 (1959), 35 Wash. L. Rev. 253 (1960).
'3 See Note, 43 Cornell L.Q. 320, 322-323 (1957), where the author summarized the inadequacies of the various dividing lines between libel and slander:
There is no universally accepted test for differentiating between libel 'and slander.
Traditionally, the distinction has been based upon the form of the publication: written
defamation constituted libel; oral defamation, slander. This written-oral dichotomy has
been rationalized by resort to various assumptions: (1) a writing is more deliberately
made than an oral statement; (2) a writing makes a greater impression on the eye
than words do on the ear; (3) a writing is more permanent than speech; and (4) a
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only upon allegation and proof (or admission) of special damage; libel
is actionable without such allegation (or admission), since damage is
conclusively presumed in the case of libel.' 4 Since the allegation of special damage in a tort action was traditionally introduced by the phrase
"per quod" (meaning "whereby"), followed by the recital of the damage,
actions requiring such allegation came to be known as "actionable per
quod"; actions which did not require such allegation were called "actionable per se."'15
The special damage required is specific pecuniary loss proximately
resulting from the published matter, such as loss of a particular customer, employment, contract, credit, marriage, election, etc., which must
be both pleaded and established with particularity.' Unless the defamed
person is able to sustain this onerous burden, when applicable, a cause
of action cannot be made out. In effect, so far as the preponderance of
defamatory matter is concerned, the existence of a remedy depends upon
whether special damage is required or not.
Slander: Per Quod; Per Se
Slanderous matter subject to the general rule requiring allegation and
proof of special damage is called nominatively "slander per quod" (or
adjectivally "slanderous per quod") to indicate that such slander is only
actionable per quod and not actionable per se.
The general rule of slander, however, is subject to certain rather wellestablished exceptions. Most jurisdictions recognize three common-law
exceptions (sometimes codified by statute):
writing has a wider area of dissemination than the spoken word. Each of the last
three assumptions has tended to become an independent test for distinguishing libel
from slander, especially for situations in which the written-oral dichotomy failed to
achieve desired results. However, analysis reveals that the underlying basis of the
written-oral dichotomy, as well as of these subsequent "tests" employed to extend
libel beyond writings, is the degree of potentiality for harm to reputation inherent in
the form of the publication. This suggests that the underlying basis itself-potentiality
for harm-ought to be the test ...
See also Gatley, Libel and Slander 1-2 (4th ed. 1953); 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.9
(1956) ; Prosser, Torts 585-588 (2d ed. 1955) ; 3 Restatement, Torts § 568 (1938) ; Prosser,
supra note 11, at 842-43.
'4 See 3 Restatement, Torts §§ 575, 569 (1938).
15 Black's Law Dictionary 1293-94 (4th ed. 1951); 3 Restatement, Torts § 569, comment
b (1938).
16 See McCormick, Damages §§ 113-15 (1935). Where a defamation action can be dismissed on motion for lack of allegation of special damage in a case requiring such allegation, the publisher can avoid expensive investigation and litigation. Of course, to the extent
that the technicalities of the special damage requirement are relaxed, the more readily
actionable is defamation. Nieman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 107 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y, 1952);
Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N.J.L. 402 (1852); cf. Ratcliffe v. Evans
[1892] 2 Q.B. 524 (injurious falsehood). See note, 47 Cornell L.Q. 92 (1961).
17 3 Restatement, Torts §§ 570-74 (1938). With respect to the "profession, trade, business, office, or calling" category of slander per se, there are two approaches: (1) "Reference
test" requiring that the published matter expressly refer to the plaintiff's profession, trade,
business, office, or calling [Shakun v. Sadinoff, 272 App. Div. 721, 74 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1st

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47

1. Imputation of a serious crime;
2. Imputation of a loathsome disease;
3. Imputation tending to injure one in one's profession, trade, business, office, or calling;
and one statutory exception (sometimes recognized in the absence of
statute):
4. Imputation of unchastity to a woman.
In the case of slanderous matter in any one of these four categories,
damage is presumed as a matter of law, thereby dispensing with the requirement of allegation and proof of special damage. These exceptions
are termed nominatively "slander per se" (or adjectivally, "slanderous
per se") to indicate that such slander is actionable per se. In summary,
then, all defamatory matter classifiable as slander is either slander per
quod, which is actionable per quod, or slander per se, which is actionable
per se.
Libel
As indicated above, the general rule of libel is that all libelous matter
is actionable without allegation and proof of special damage ("actionable per se"). By this traditional approach, all defamatory matter classifiable as libel is "libel" without any "per se"--"per quod" breakdown.
The phrase "libel per se" (or "libelous per se") is tautologous; the term
"libel per quod" is self-contradictory.
Notwithstanding the traditional approach, the phrases, "libel per se,"
"libelous per se," "libel per quod," and "libel-by-extrinsic-fact" have
been increasingly used in recent years. Appreciation of their significance
and the confusion they have engendered depends to a large extent on an
understanding of the curiously technical requirements imposed in connection with pleading of defamation actions at common law. In addition
to allegations of the published matter in haec verba, the fact of its publication by the defendant, and consequent damages in order to make out
the cause of action or to enhance the verdict or both, etc., the declaration
(or complaint) might have had to include any one or more of the following:18 (1) inducement, (2) colloquium, (3) innuendo.
Dep't 1947)]; (2) "Relation test" requiring only that the published matter bear a relation
to the plaintiff's profession, trade, business, office [Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398
(1871); 3 Restatement, Torts § 573, comment e (1938)].

See Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 946

(1953Y. Cf. Bassell v. Ellmore, 48 N.Y. 561 (1872) (holding slanderous imputation of
unchastity prior to 1871 New York statute not to constitute slander per se). By statute,
California and a few other jurisdictions have made actionable per se slander imputing to
a man or woman impotence or want of chastity. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 46(4) (Deering 1960); Annot., 55 A.L.R. 175 (1928).
18 Shipman, Common Law Pleading 219-21 (3d ed. 1923). The distinction between the
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Inducement
The inducement (from induco, meaning "lead to") was the name given
to the explanatory allegation of fact introducing the main allegations
(or gravamen) of the declaration in common-law pleading. 9 In a defamation case, the inducement supplied allegations of fact extrinsic to the
published matter itself." While serving functions relating to several
elements of defamation,2 ' the principal function of the inducement, so
far as libel-by-extrinsic-fact was concerned, was to supply extrinsic facts
which rendered matter nondefamatory on its face capable of having a
defamatory meaning. The inducement also had to be "in traversable
form," i.e., any extrinsic fact had to be so alleged that it could be readily
traversed or denied by the defendant.
three terms was neatly put by De Grey, C.J., in Rex v. Home, 2 Cowp. 672, 684, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1300, 1306-07 (K.B. 1777), quoted in Kinney v. Nash, 3 N.Y. 177, 183 (1849):
'In an action upon the case against a man for saying of another "he has burnt my
barn," the plaintiff cannot, by way of innuendo say, "meaning his barn full of corn;"
because that is not an explanation of what is said before, but an addition to it. But
if, in the introduction, it had been averred that the defendant had a barn full of corn,
and that, in a discourse about that barn, the defendant had spoken the words charged,
of the plaintiff, an innuendo of its being a barn full of corn would be good: for by
coupling the innuendo in the words with the introductory averment, "his barn full of
corn," would have made it complete. Here the extrinsic fact that the defendant had
a barn full of corn is the introduction or inducement; the allegation that the words
were uttered in a conversation relating to that barn, is the colloquium: and the explanation that the words thus spoken were applied to that barn full of corn, is the
innuendo.'
See Bloss v. Tobey, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 320 (1824); 3 Restatement, Torts § 563, comment
f (1938); Hall, "Pleading in Libel Actions in California," 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 225, 231 n. 23
(1939).
19 Shipman, supra note 18 at 195, 505.
20 Such extrinsic facts could comprehend all of the surrounding circumstances necessary
to define the meaning of the published matter, and could include (1) the circumstances
under which the matter was published, (2) the circumstances connecting the published
matter to the plaintiff, (3) the circumstances of the plaintiff's status which rendered published matter, which was nondefamatory on its face, capable of a defamatory meaning, or
(4) any other circumstances which rendered published matter nondefamatory on its face
capable of a defamatory meaning. Extrinsic facts of course, can render nondefamatory
published matter which on its face appears defamatory. See Pallotta v. Uhtenwoldt, 167
Misc. 472, 3 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1938); 3 Restatement, Torts § 563,
comment e (1938). See also Bloss v. Tobey, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 320 (1824); Kinney v. Nash,
3 N.Y. 177 (1849); Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 211 (N.Y. 1809).
21 Extrinsic facts under which the published matter was published relate to the question
of publication and the capability of the published matter of having a defamatory meaning.
Extrinsic facts connecting the published matter to the plaintiff is solely concerned with
the application of the published matter to the plaintiff. Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 213
(N.Y. 1812). Extrinsic facts rendering published matter nondefamatory on its face capable
of having a defamatory meaning relate only to the question of whether or not the published
matter is capable of having a defamatory meaning. Sweetapple v. Jesse, 5 B. & Ad. 27,
110 Eng. Rep. 702 (K.B. 1833); Boydell v. Jones, 4 M. & W. 446, 150 Eng. Rep. 1504
(Ex. 1838); Foulger v. Newcomb, L.R. 2 Ex. 327, 36 L.J. Ex. 169 (1867).
22 Rex v. Horne, 2 Cowp. 672, 98 Eng. Rep. 1300 (K.B. 1777). The technical requirement was that such allegations could not be mixed with the innuendo, which being no more
than a logical inference was not subject to proof, since the defamatory character of the
matter depended on the existence of the extrinsic facts and the defendant should have an
opportunity to meet the plaintiff's attempt to prove them.
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Colloquium
The colloquium 23 also served a multiple function. Primarily, it was
the part of the declaration which alleged the ultimate facts necessary to
identify the plaintiff as the person defamed.14 Such identification (other-

wise known as "application") might appear from the face of the published matter or might have to be established by extrinsic fact. In the
latter case, the inducement supplied the necessary extrinsic fact. Application-by-extrinsic-fact should not be confused with libel-by-extrinsicfact.
Modern pleading in some jurisdictions dispenses with the necessity of
alleging extrinsic facts to show the application of the defamatory matter
to the plaintiff and requires only the allegation of the conclusion of law
that the publication of the defamatory matter was "of and concerning"
the plaintiffi 5 Where the defendant denies application, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving it by sufficient evidence.26 The colloquium sometimes also served the additional function of connecting any extrinsic fact
27
alleged in the inducement with the published matter.

Innuendo
The innuendo was that part of the declaration which explained the
meaning of the published matter, either taken by itself or together with
the extrinsic facts alleged in the inducement. Such an explanation, frequently in parenthetical form, was called an innuendo because it was
originally introduced by the word "innuendo" (translatable as "meaning").28 The function of the innuendo, like that of the colloquium, was
two-fold.
The more important function of the innuendo was to ascribe a defamatory meaning to published matter which, either taken by itself or
together with the extrinsic facts alleged in the inducement, was reasonably capable of both defamatory and nondefamatory meanings. In the
23 The term "colloquium" is derived from the phrase "in quodam colloquio" (translatable as "in a certain conversation") from the averment in slander that the defendant
spoke the slanderous words concerning the plaintiff or the subject matter in question "in
a certain conversation." Webster's New International Dictionary 527 (2d ed. 1946).
24 Shipman, supra note 18 at 219-20.
25 Clark, Code Pleading 315-16 (2d ed. 1947). N.Y. R. Civ. Prac. 96 is a typical provision:
In an action for libel or slander, it is not necessary to state in the complaint any
extrinsic fact for the purpose of showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter, but the plaintiff may state in general terms that such matter was
published or spoken concerning him.
See Van Heusen v. Argenteau, 194 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E. 437 (1909); Fry v. Bennett, 7 N.Y.
Super. Ct. 54 (1851). See note 37 infra.
26 See Nunnally v. Tribune Ass'n, 111 App. Div. 485, 97 N.Y. Supp. 908 (Ist Dep't
1906), aff'd mem., 186 N.Y. 533, 78 N.E. 1108 (1906).
27 Shipman, 220; Black's Law Dictionary 330 (4th ed. 1951).
28 Black's Law Dictionary 927 (4th ed. 1951).
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absence of the required innuendo, the matter was construed in its nondefamatory sense and the declaration deemed defective as not stating a
cause of action for defamation. 9 While the technical niceties of this
common-law rule have been relaxed, the substance of the rule has been
retained in modern pleading. 30
The other function of the innuendo, which had nothing to do with
libel-by-extrinsic-fact, was to point out the application of the defamatory
matter to the plaintiff by inserting the parenthetical phrase "(meaning
the plaintiff)" throughout the text of the published matter quoted in the
declaration wherever there was doubt that such text referred to him.3
In this sense, the innuendo complemented the colloquium so far as application was concerned.
As an allegation of inference rather than fact, the innuendo did not
have to be "in traversable form."m
Since the primary function of the innuendo was strictly limited to
explaining or defining equivocal published matter, it could not properly
extend or enlarge the meaning of such matter either by interpreting it
unreasonably33 or by adding allegations of extrinsic fact, which could
34
only be effectively pleaded in the inducement.
Whether the published matter, either taken by itself or as supplemented by extrinsic fact, was reasonably capable of the construction put
upon it by the innuendo alleged was a question of law for the court. If
such matter was not reasonably capable of supporting the innuendo but
nevertheless was so equivocal as to require an innuendo, the complaint
was dismissable. If, on the other hand, such matter was capable of the
meaning placed upon it by the innuendo, the question of whether that
meaning was so understood was one of fact for the jury to decide.3 5
In view of the complementary and somewhat overlapping functions
of the colloquium, the inducement, and the innuendo in common-law
29 Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893). See also authorities cited in
13 McKinney, Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice 57 (1898). See notes 44, 127, 134,
135, 138, 139 infra.
30

See, e.g., Lasky v. Kempton, 285 App. Div. 1121, 140 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1955),

where a complaint was dismissed for lack of a properly pleaded innuendo. The modem
English practice is similar and is described in Gatley, Libel and Slander 465-69 (4th ed.
1953).
31 1 Chitty, Pleading 422-24 (16th Amer. ed. 1876); Newell, Slander and Libel 588 (4th
ed. 1924) ; Odgers, Libel and Slander 98-115 (6th ed. 1929).
32 Properly, it could not be, since it posed a question of logical inference rather than one
of fact. See 13 McKinney, supra note 29, at 54 n. 3 (1898).
33 Broome v. Godsen, 1 C.B. 728, 135 Eng. Rep. 728 (C-P. 1845); Odgers, supra note
31, at 99 (6th ed. 1929). See notes 75-77 infra. As sometimes stated, it was not the nature
of an innuendo to beget an action.
34 Barbam v. Nethersall, Yelv. 22, 80 Eng. Rep. 16 (K.B. 1602); Newell, supra note 31,
at 598 (4th ed. 1924). See notes 69-72 infra.
35 3 Restatement, Torts § 614 (1938); see also 1 Harper & James, Torts § 5.29 (1956);
Comment, "Functions of Judge and Jury in Defamation Cases in New York," 43 Cornell
L.Q. 80, 82-83 (1957). See notes 73, 74 infra.
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pleading, confused usage of the terms has arisen.3 6 These varying usages
have undoubtedly contributed to the more substantial confusion prevailing with respect to the terms "libel-by-extrinsic-fact," "libel per se,"
and "libelous per se."
Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact
The term "libel-by-extrinsic-fact," unlike "libel per se," is rather
easily defined. Properly used, it has reference to matter so published
as to be classifiable as libel and rendered defamatory only by reference
to extrinsic fact; the term has no relevance to whether extrinsic fact
is necessary to establish application or whether an innuendo is required." If such matter were so published as to be classifiable as slander,
it would be called "slander-by-extrinsic-fact." 38
Libel Per Se; Libelous Per Se
"Libel per se" literally means "libel on its face" or "libel in itself,"
terms which themselves may have variable meanings. To distinguish
"libel per se" from that which is not "libel per se," many courts, on the
basis that slander per quod was the alternative to slander per se, began
to think of libel other than "libel per se" as "libel per quod.139 This
adoption of slander law terminology for libel was done with no apparent
38 See Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 146 A.2d 880 (1958); Cal. Civ. Code Ann.

§ 45a

(Deering 1960), and note 143 infra; I Harper & James, Torts 373 (1956) ; Carpenter,
"Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States," 17 So. Cal. L. Rev. 347, 353 (1944);
Isham, "Libel Per Se and Libel Per Quad in Ohio," 15 Ohio St. L.J. 303, 304 (1954).
37 Courts occasionally confuse libel-by-extrinsic-fact and application-by-extrinsic-fact.
The sounder view would appear to be that application-by-extrinsic-fact, if made out, should
be governed by the same rules applicable to application by express reference to the plaintiff.
Brayton v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1953), 22 U. Cinc. L.
Rev. 511 (1953); Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 47 Del. 526, 94 A.2d 385 (1952); Marr v.
Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 246 P.2d 509 (1952), 41 Calif. L. Rev. 144 (1953), 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
220 (1953); Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.
2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961); Katapodis v. Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 287 N.Y. 17, 38
N.E.2d 112 (1941); Le Dans, Ltd. v. Daley, 10 App. Div. 2d 502, 200 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1st
Dep't 1960); Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 285, 182
N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1959) (3-2), rev'd on other grounds, 7 N.Y.2d 435, 166 N.E.2d
319, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1960) (4-3) (defamatory matter held not written of and concerning
plaintiff). Cf. Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 18, 153 N.Y.S.2d 190
(1st Dep't 1956) (4-1), aff'd without opinion, 5 N.Y.2d 994, 157 N.E.2d 728, 184 N.Y.S.2d
856 (1959); Anderson v. Music Trades Corp., - Misc. 2d - 209 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1960); Gillman v. Tenth District Dental Society of New York, 25
Misc. 2d 457, 201 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960). But see Lininger v. Knight,
123 Colo. 213, 226 P.2d 809 (1951), 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 487 (1951); Rowan v. Gazette
Printing Co., 74 Mont. 326, 239 Pac. 1035 (1925). See notes 25 supra and 143 infra.
38 Defamation-by-extrinsic-fact is sometimes called "defamation covert;" defamation on
its face has been called "defamation ex fade." Such terminology helps avoid the semantic
confusion resulting from per quod-per se usage. The term, "prima fade defamatory," can
cause as much confusion as the latter usage. See note 44 infra.
39 Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 304 P.2d 926 (1956); Rowan v. Gazette Printing
Co., 74 Mont. 326, 239 Pac. 1035 (1925); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195
S.E. 55 (1938), 27 Calif. L. Rev. 84 (1938), 26 Geo. L.J. 1054 (1938), 37 Mich. L. Rev.
156 (1938), 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 594 (1938); Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 138
N.E.2d 391 (1956); Oliveros v. Henderson, 116 S.C. 77, 106 S.E. 855 (1920).
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realization that the phrases "per se" and "per quod" in slander law related to the special damage requirement and distinguished slander actionable per se from slander actionable per quod,40 and had no necessary
relevance to the distinction between matter defamatory "on its face" or
"in itself," and matter not defamatory "on its face" or "in itself." The
inevitable consequence of such semantic confusion was to require special
41
damage for libel other than libel per se.
Thus, the meaning of "libel per se" may be of critical importance in
determining whether or not the special damage requirement applies.
Some cases, by emphasizing the "libel on its face" meaning, use "libel
per se" in contrast to libel-by-extrinsic-fact.42 Other cases are cited as
assimilating libel-by-extrinsic-fact to slander, and concluding that whatever published written matter, supplemented by extrinsic fact, would,
if published orally, constitute slander per se, constitutes libel per se.43
Other usages of "libel per se" (and "libelous per se") have developed.
Some cases take the position that in cases of libel, whether by extrinsic
fact or otherwise, there is no "libel per se" if an innuendo is required.4 4
40 Prosser, "Libel Per Quod," 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 848 n. 71 (1960). Dean Prosser suggests that most American courts were in fact assimilating libel-by-extrinsic-fact to slander
because "the libel, as a libel, is incomplete," and "that, as is so often the case, the courts
have known exactly what they were doing, and that it is the critics who are confused." Id.
at 849. However, most of the cases he cites do not appear to do what they are cited as
doing. See notes 128, 140 infra. See also Prosser, Torts 588 (2d ed. 1955) ; Note, "Libel Per
Se and Special Damages," 13 Vand. L. Rev. 730 (1960); Comment, "New York, Libel Per
Quod, and Special Damages: An Unresolved Dilemma," 27 Ford. L. Rev. 405 (1958); Note,
"The Doctrine of Libel Per Se in Ohio," 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 43 (1957). For other possible
explanations of what has been bothering the courts in "libel per quod" cases, see notes 152
and 153 infra.
41 Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 304 P.2d 926 (1956); Burr v. Winnett Times Publishing Co., 80 Mont. 70, 258 Pac. 242 (1927) ; Rowan v. Gazette Printing Co., 74 Mont. 326,
239 Pac. 1035 (1925); Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280 N.W. 215 (1938); Becker v.
Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956); Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass'n,
55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac. 769 (1909); Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 Utah 74, 83 Pac. 573
(1905).
42 MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959), 33 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 88, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 685 (1960) ; 7 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 560 (1960) ; Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959); Manley v. Harer, 73 Mont. 253, 235 Pac. 757
(1925); Prosser, "Libel Per Quod," 46 Va. L. Rev. 839 (1960); Comment, "New York,
Libel Per Quod, and Special Damages: An Unresolved Dilemma," 27 Fordham L. Rev. 405
(1958); Note, "Libel Per Se in Oklahoma," 10 Okla. L. Rev. 474 (1957). Libel-by-extrinsicfact would appear a preferable term. Seelman, The Law of Libel and Slander in the State
of New York § 34 (1933).
43 Whether or not the plaintiff's profession, trade, business, office, or calling, if not expressly referred to in the published matter, is, under slander law, an extrinsic fact or not
depends upon whether the "reference test" or "relation test" is followed. See note 17 supra
and notes 128, 140 infra.
44 LaGrange Press v. Citizen Publishing Co., 252 Ill.
App. 482 (1929); Miller v. First
Nat'l Bank, 220 Iowa 1266, 264 N.W. 272 (1935); Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des
Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932), 86 A.L.R. 839; Thompson v.
Upton, 218 Md. 433, 146 A.2d 880 (1958) (unnecessary innuendo ignored as surplusage);
Gustin v. Evening Press Co., 172 Mich. 311, 137 N.W. 674 (1912); Rail v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 198 Mo. App. 463, 478, 192 S.W. 129, 135 (1917) ; Woolston v. Montana Free
Press, 90 Mont. 299, 2 P.2d 1020 (1931); Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d
391 (1956); Edwards v. Crane, 292 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1956), 10 Okla. L. Rev. 233 (1957);
Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 174 Okla. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935), 14 Texas L. Rev. 410
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The rationale in such cases seems to be that if written published matter is
reasonably capable of only a defamatory meaning, it is libelous as a matter of law ("per se"); if capable of both defamatory and nondefamatory
meanings, thereby requiring an innuendo and presenting an additional
jury question, it is not defamatory as a matter of law and not libel "per
se." Other cases call "libel per se" any published written matter, whether
or not supported by extrinsic fact, which is capable of a defamatory
45
meaning.
Still other cases seem to use the terms "libel" and "libel per se" interchangeably, ignoring the redundancy of the latter phrase, requiring special damage only for torts related to libel 46 and occasionally compounding the confusion by referring to the latter as "libel per quod.47 Finally,
(1936); See Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 45a (Deering 1960); Spiegel, "Defamation by Implication-In the Confidential Manner," 29 So. Cal. L. Rev. 306, 309-13 (1956); Note,
"Determination of Libel Per Se Not Precluded By a Possible Innocent Meaning," 7
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 560 (1960). See note 41 supra. "Libelous as a matter of law" is preferable
to "libel per se" in characterizing such libel. See Brown v. DuFrey, 1 N.Y.2d 190, 134
N.E.2d 469, 151 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1956), 21 Albany L. Rev. 120 (1957), 23 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 156 (1956). See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938);
Wimmer v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 151 Okla. 123, 1 P.2d 671 (1931) (libelous per se
where no innuendo, colloquium or inducement required to make out libel). See note 45
infra. The innuendo test has been characterized as a throw-back to the doctrine of mitiori
sensu. Note, "Libel Per Se and Special Damages," 13 Vand. L. Rev. 730, 735, 743 (1960).
The uses by the Oklahoma Supreme Court of the term "libelous per se" are criticized in
Note, "Libel Per Se in Oklahoma," 10 Okla. L. Rev. 474, 475 (1957).
45 Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945);
Greyhound Sec. Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 390, 207 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1st
Dep't 1960); Westropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947)
(4-3); Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., 54 Wash. 2d 743, 344 P.2d 705 (1959). See note 46 infra.
For criticisms of Ohio decisions, see Note, "The Doctrine of Libel Per Se in Ohio," 9 W.
Res. L. Rev. 43 (1957). A few cases have suggested a presumption-of-damage test. Whitaker
v. Sherbrook Distributing Co., 189 S.C. 243, 200 S.E. 848 (1939); Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 Utah 74, 83 Pac. 573 (1905). Such a test appears to beg the question. See
note 14 supra.
46 Hanaw v. Jackson Patriot Co., 98 Mich. 506, 57 N.W. 734 (1894); Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280 N.W. 215 (1938); Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc.,
294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945); Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84
Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911). Compare Hardwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961) with Drug Research
Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 7 N.Y.2d 435, 166 N.E.2d 319, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1960)
(4-3). See Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd & Co., 75 Okla. 84, 182 Pac. 494 (1919), 5 A.L.R. 1349.
See Note, "Libel Per Se and Special Damages," 13 Vand. L. Rev. 730, 734 n. 21 (1960);
Note, "Libel Per Se in Oklahoma," 10 Okla. L. Rev. 474 (1957); Note, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev.
92 (1916).
47 Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 594, 37 N.E.2d 584, 594 (1941), 40 Mich. L.
Rev. 919 (1942), 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861 (1942); Hall, "Pleading in Libel Actions in
California," 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 225, 229-30 n.16 (1939). This tort (or different aspects
of it) is variously called injurious falsehood, disparagement, slander of title, slander of
goods, disparagement of title, disparagement of goods, trade libel, libel on the thing, unfair
competition, interference with prospective advantage, etc. See Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892]
2 Q.B. 524; Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934), 14 B.U.L.
Rev. 856 (1934), 4 Brooklyn L. Rev. 95 (1934), 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 328 (1934). 1 Harper
& James, Torts §§ 6.1-6.4 (1956) ; Prosser, Torts § 108 (2d ed. 1955) ; Salmond, Torts 447
(3d ed. 1912); 3 Restatement, Torts ch. 28 (1938); Prosser, "Injurious Falsehood: The"
Basis of Liability," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 425 (1959). See "The Doctrine of Libel Per Se in
Ohio," 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 43, 50 (1957); Note, 28 Cornell L.Q. 226 (1943).
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there are opinions and comments which use "libel per se" and "libelous
per se" in varying senses.48
NEW YORK "RULE"

The New York libel-by-extrinsic-fact "rule" is generally attributed to
the case of O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co.,49 decided by the New
York Court of Appeals in 1915. The opinion contained the following
language:5"

The appellant then invokes the established rules of law that: (a) a publisher of a libel not defamatory upon its face, and defamatory by virtue of
extrinsic facts is liable only for the pecuniary damage which legally resulted
from the publication; and (b) the facts showing such damage must be fully

and specifically set forth in the complaint. General allegations of damage
are not sufficient. [Citing Bassell v. Elmore;51 Stone v. Cooper;52 Crashley
v. Press Pub. Co.; 58 McNamara v. Goldan54 .] . . .
An examination of the earlier New York decisions, including those
cited in the O'Connell opinion, reveals that no case had held that where
resort to extrinsic facts was necessary in order to show that the matter
was defamatory, special damages had to be pleaded and proved.
Pre-1915 Cases
The pre-1915 cases, which on first blush would seem to lend some support to the language in the O'Connell case, can be divided into four principal groups:
1. Those in which the plaintiff failed to plead any (or sufficient) extrinsic
facts (required inducement lacking);
2. Those in which extrinsic facts were improperly pleaded (inducement
improperly pleaded);
3. Those in which the plaintiff failed to plead an innuendo assigning a
defamatory meaning to equivocal published matter (required innuendo
lacking);
4. Those in which the published matter alone or together with the extrinsic
facts pleaded did not support the innuendo pleaded (innuendo not
supported by published matter or inducement).
48 Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 145,
Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62
Crane, 292 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1956); Prosser, "Libel Per
(1960), discussed in notes 124, 136 infra; 36 CJ. § 17
an excellent analysis of the prevailing confusion, see
Damages," 13 Vand. L. Rev. 730, 733-35 (1960).
49 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
50 Id. at 358, 108 N.E. at 557.
51 48 N.Y. 561 (1872).
52 2 Denio 293, 299 (N.Y. 1845).
53 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904).
54 194 N.Y. 315, 87 N.E. 440 (1909).

203 P.2d 594 (1949); Balabanoff v.
N.E.2d 599 (1945); Edwards v.
Quod," 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 843-48
(1924); 53 CJ.S. § 8 (1948). For
Note, "Libel Per Se and Special
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Required Extrinsic Facts Not Pleaded
In Crashley v. Press Publishing Co.,5 5 cited by the Court of Appeals
in the O'Connell case, the published matter stated that a revolutionary
movement in Brazil had its headquarters in the plaintiff's boatshop there.
After dismissal of the complaint in the lower courts,56 the defendants
argued in the Court of Appeals: (1) the published matter was not libelous per se; (2) the plaintiff had not pleaded that rebellion was a
crime under the laws of Brazil; (3) to sustain an action for libel with
special damages, the latter must be pecuniary; (4) such damages must
be the natural and proximate result of the publication and were not in
this case; and (5) the plaintiff, therefore, failed to make out a case of
libel with special damages.57 The Court of Appeals (6-1) affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint, saying: 58
The article was not libelous per se. To complain of an article as being
libelous, because charging the complainant with taking part in a revolt,
or rebellion, within the government of Brazil, is quite insufficient, in the
absence of an allegation of the existence of some statute, making such an
act a treasonable offense and prescribing pains, or penalties, for the commission of the crime. The court cannot assume that the laws of Brazil
are similar to the common law upon the subject of treason to the State.
.. If the article had imputed to the plaintiff the commission of that which
is an heinous offense against organized society, and commonly known to be
recognized as such by civilized nations; if it charged him with some
conduct, which reflected upon his character, in such wise as to expose
him to contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, it would be libelous per se.
[H]istory teaches us that [in South America] ... as elsewhere, there have

been numerous instances of persons, whose leadership, or participation,
in a revolt against the government, has exalted them in the public eye,
because regarded as having devoted, or sacrificed, themselves in a heroic
effort to right some great political wrong and to bring about a freer
enjoyment of political rights, or a moral administration of government....
The complaint, showing no publication actionable per se, is defective for
alleging no special pecuniary damages. [Citing Stone v. Cooper] ....
Thus, the Crashley case merely stands for the proposition that when
the published matter is not itself libelous ("libelous per se"), any extrinsic fact necessary to give the published matter a defamatory meaning
must be pleaded in the complaint. Otherwise, the complaint does not
allege a libel ("publication actionable per se"), and the plaintiff's remedy, if any, would be an action on the case for false (but nondefamatory) words, i.e., injurious falsehood, a required element of which is
"special pecuniary damages.""5°
55 See note 53 supra.
56 74 App. Div. 118, 77 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dep't 1902).
57 Supra note 53 at 31.
58 Id. at 32, 33, 34, 71 N.E. at 259.
59 See note 47 supra.
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In Van Heusen v. Argenteau, ° cited by defendant's counsel, but not
by the Court of Appeals in the O'Connell case, the defendant wrote a
letter that was published in a newspaper. The letter dealt with the disqualification of defendant's dog and stated that it was a matter for the
"N.E.K.C." It went on to the effect that the culprit could be discovered
by determining who had had the opportunity to dye the dog, who had
had the motive, and who had discovered on the last day of the show that
the dog had been dyed. Finally, it claimed that an answer to these questions would reveal who had committed the crime involved. The plaintiff
sued, alleging that the letter was intended to brand her as the culprit.
On appeal from the lower courts' holding that the complaint stated a
cause of action,6 the defendant argued that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action without an allegation of special damage, unless
the publication complained of was libelous per se, and that this publication was not libelous per se.62 The Court of Appeals held that there was
no cause of actioti, stating (per Cullen, Ch. J.):63
In my judgment the article does not on its face libel any individual....
If at an exhibition of dogs where parties enter their respective animals
and compete for prizes, a person in order to secure an award of the prize
for himself should do something to the competing dogs which would exclude
them from the chance of receiving the award it would be dishonorable,
and to impute to a person the commission of such an act would be libelous.
The difficulty here is that there is no allegation in the complaint that there
was any exhibition or competition of the kind suggested, nor that either
defendant's dog nor the plaintiff's were entered therein. The courts cannot
take judicial notice of the meaning of the initials 'N.K.C.' nor if those
initials stand for the name of some association, what are its objects and
what business it conducts. There is in the letter a reference to a 'show'
and from the fact that a dog seems to have been the cause of this
controversy we may imagine that the show was a dog show, but are we to
take notice of how dog shows are conducted, that competition between
entries is had at such exhibitions and that prizes are awarded? These are
all extrinsic matters that should have been alleged in the complaint ...
Again the holding was merely that where extrinsic facts are required to
give a defamatory meaning to matter which is innocent on its face, such
facts must be alleged in the complaint. Since the plaintiff made no attempt to allege extrinsic facts, the question of special damage never
arose.
In Stone v. Cooper,6 4 cited by the Court of Appeals in the O'Connell
case, an action was brought for an article which stated in part: 65 "'Mr.
60 194 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E. 437 (1909).
61 124 App. Div. 776, 109 N.Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1908).
62 194 N.Y. 309, 310 (1909).
63 Id. at 313, 314, 87 N.E. at 439.
64 2 Denio 293 (N.Y.1845).
65 Id. at 294.
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J. Fennimore Cooper need not be so fidgety in his anxiety to finger the
cash to be paid by us towards his support.'" In rejecting (15-5) the
claim that this was libelous per se, the Court for the Correction of
Errors pointed out that although it knew that a libel award was
the source of the cash referred to, it could not take judicial notice
of such fact. Therefore, if the plaintiff supposed that the defendant intended to convey the impression that the plaintiff was in the habit
of prosecuting libel suits for the sole purpose of obtaining money for his
support, he should have alleged the nature of the controversy upon which
the award was made together with such additional facts as would support this interpretation. The Court continued:
Whether this part of the publication could have been made libellous by
any averments of extrinsic facts and circumstances, it is not necessary
now to determine. It is sufficient to say it is not libellous per se; and that
there is nothing in the declaration which can authorize the court to say
it was calculated to injure the character of the plaintiff, or to degrade
him in the public estimation ....
66
Where from the nature of the charge, therefore, in connection with other
facts stated in the plaintiff's declaration, no such injury or loss will
necessarily or even probably result to him in consequence of the
publication of such charge, he cannot recover damages as for a libel,
without averring and proving that special damage has been in fact
sustained by him... 67

Here, again, the holding was that the complaint alleged nothing "libelous
per se " and that the extrinsic fact was not supplied by any inducement.
Since recovery, "as for a libel," without allegation and proof of special
damage, failed, relief would have to be based on some tort theory other
than defamation and hence would require allegation and proof of special
damage.

68

Extrinsic Facts Pleaded Improperly
Extrinsic facts, as shown above, must be alleged in the inducement
independenly---"in traversable form"--and not as part of any innuendo.
Under such rule, the courts must ignore extrinsic facts which are not
properly pleaded, thereby treating the complaint as not alleging any
extrinsic facts at all. The result is that the plaintiff cannot recover because he has not shown that the matter is defamatory.
Illustrative of this rule is McNamara v. Goldan 69 decided on the
same day as Van Heusen v. Argenteau,1 0 and also cited by the Court of
16 Id. at 298.
67 Id. at 300.

68 See note 59 supra.
69 194 N.Y. 315, 87 N.E. 440 (1909).
70 See notes 62, 63 supra.
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29

Appeals in the O'Connell case. The action for libel was based upon a
letter written by the defendant in which plaintiff was referred to by
name and which dealt with certain anonymous letters that had been sent
through the mails (though not apparently connecting plaintiff to them).
The plaintiff claimed that defendant's letter imputed to him the authorship of obscene letters. This claim was, however, stated only by way
of an innuendo explaining the phrase "anonymous letters." In affirming
the dismissal of the complaint, 7 the Court said (per Chase, J.):"
The letter does not charge the person therein referred to with the commission of any crime defined by statute or known to the common law, nor
of any act or conduct entitling the plaintiff to damages without proof
of extrinsic facts.... It does not appear from the letter that the anonymous
It was,
letters complained of were not in themselves entirely innocent ....
therefore, necessary for the plaintiff to include in his complaint allegations
of extrinsic facts to show that the words used in the letter are actionable.
As the letter is not defamatory and libelous per se it was also necessary
for the plaintiff to allege and claim special damages arising from the
publication of the letter. [Citing Crashley v. Press PublishingCo.]
Required Innuendo Not Pleaded
When published matter, either itself or by reference to extrinsic fact,
is reasonably capable of both defamatory. and nondefamatory meanings,
the complaint, as previously discussed, must state by way of innuendo
the defamatory meaning.
Thus in the Crashley case,7 3 the plaintiff also argued that the words
"an Englishman, of more or less indifferent repute" were libelous per se.
The Court disagreed:7 4
If the complaint had alleged the libelous meaning by innuendo, to wit,
that the words meant that the plaintiff's reputation, or character, was
bad, that would have been so. As a mere statement, however, without
innuendo, the language signifies nothing, except that the person spoken
of had no particular 'repute,' one way or the other, or that he had but an
ordinary reputation, or that he was too obscure to have gained any repute.
Many persons possessing excellent characteristics might find themselves in
that category.
The complaint, showing no publication actionable per se, is defective
for alleging no special pecuniary damages....
Innuendo Not Supported by Published Matter or Inducement
When an innuendo is required and the innuendo pleaded is not supported either by the published matter or by the extrinsic fact alleged
in the inducement, the pleaded innuendo must be ignored. The result
71 122 App. Div. 922, 108 N.Y. Supp. 1139 (Ist Dep't 1907).
72 194 N.Y. 315, 321, 87 N.E. 440, 442 (1909). See also Andrews v. Woodmansee, 15
Wend. 232 (N.Y. 1836): Vaughan v. Havens, 8 Johns. R. 109 (N.Y. 1811).
73 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904).

74 Id. at 34, 71 N.E. at 260.
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is the same as if no innuendo were pleaded at all. Since no cause of
action for defamation is stated if the required innuendo is missing, the
complaint must then be tested by the related tort theory of injurious
(but nondefamatory) falsehood which requires special damage. 75
The case of Potter v. Pictorial Review Co. 71 is in point. The article

complained of was alleged to have charged plaintiff, a civil engineer,
with having, on the suggestion of politicians, drawn plans for a city
water supply station with inadequate provision for purification, and
with improperly concealing such defect. On appeal, the overruling of
the defendant's demurrer was reversed: 77
It is nowhere alleged that plaintiff was ever an official of the city or
even that he was generally referred to or known as such. Plaintiff, therefore, can have no benefit from the innuendoes which attempt to enlarge
the plain meaning of the words of the article ....

The article, thus inter-

preted, contains nothing libelous per se, and, as there is no special damage
alleged, the demurrer was good.
Other Libel Cases
Only by quoting out of context statements from the above analyzed
opinions, some admittedly not as aptly phrased as they might have
been, can any verbal support be found for the broad language in the
O'Connell case. Moreover, there are pre-1915 New York libel cases
whose actual holdings are directly contrary to such broad language.
Among such cases are those upholding a cause of action without special
damage where the published matter, although nondefamatory on its
face, was rendered defamatory by reference to properly pleaded extrinsic facts relating to the plaintiff's profession, trade, business, office,
calling,7" or other status,7 9 or to circumstances other than the plaintiff's
status.8 o
The leading case is Gates v. New York Recorder Co.,8 l which, while
75 See note 59 supra.
76 156 App. Div. 874, 142 N.Y. Supp. 208 (1st Dep't 1913); see also Van Heusen v.
Argenteau, 194 N.Y. 309, 312-13, 87 N.E. 437, 438-39 (1909); Parker v. Bennett, 68 App.
Div. 148, 74 N.Y. Supp. 214 (1st Dep't 1902).
77 156 App. Div. 875, 142 N.Y. Supp. 208 (1st Dep't 1913).
78 See Gideon v. Dwyer, 87 Hun 246, 33 N.Y. Supp. 754 (Gen. Term, 1st Dep't 1895)
(slander); CrandaU v. Jacob, 22 App. Div. 400, 48 N.Y. Supp. 279 (2d Dep't 1897)
(slander). See also Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398 (1871) (where it is held that
extrinsic facts as to plaintiff's profession may be shown to enhance damages in an action
for libel otherwise actionable); Cruikshank v. Bennett, 30 Misc. 232, 62 N.Y. Supp. 118
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1900).
79 Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890) (married man
accused of being prospective defendant in breach of promise suit).
80 Gates v. New York Recorder Co., 155 N.Y. 228, 49 N.E. 769 (1898); Chapman v.
Smith, 13 Johns. R. 77 (N.Y. 1816). Cf. Stone v. Cooper. 2 Denio 293 (N.Y. 1845): Bonner
v. McPhail, 31 Barb. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 1860). See also Horton v. Binghamton Press Co., 122 App. Div. 332, 106 N.Y. Supp. 875 (3d Dep't 1907), appeal dismissed, 200
N.Y. 550, 93 N.E. 1112 (1910).
81 155 N.Y. 228, 49 N.E. 769 (1898).
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pleaded and tried as a libel-by-extrinsic-fact case did involve facts
which were probably capable of judicial notice. There the defendant
newspaper had published of the plaintiff, three days after her marriage,
that she was a "'dashing blonde, twenty years old, and is said to have
been a concert-hall singer and dancer at Coney Island.' ,,82
The plaintiff sued, alleging that Coney Island concert halls were
resorts for disorderly persons and that the female performers were
generally depraved, and at the trial gave evidence to substantiate her
claim. On appeal, the defendant urged, inter alia: (1) The complaint
should have been dismissed since the words were not libelous per se
and no special damages had been alleged; and (2) the admission of
evidence on the reputation of the Coney Island concert halls was error.8 3
84
The Court of Appeals (4-2) affirmed:
To say that the words published of the plaintiff in the community where
the character of the concert hall is well known were not calculated to hold
her up to disgrace and disrepute and to charge her with unchaste conduct,
is to reach a conclusion both illogical and unjust. Such a charge is libelous
per se....
Although the facts here involved were so well-known in the community
as to be the subject of judicial notice, there are other decisions in accord
where the knowledge of the facts was not so widespread.,5
Slander-by-Extrinsic-Fact
There are pre-1915 New York slander cases where, despite the
necessity of reference to extrinsic fact to bring the published matter
within one of the four categories of slander per se, special damage was
not required."8 Thus in Gideon v. Dwyer, 7 the oral utterance sued on
was:

88

'You are no sportsman. You had to leave Nashville on account of a turf
fraud you committed there. President Clark, of the Louisville Jockey
Club, wanted to rule you off for your crooked practices there, and warned
you off the turf there, and you had to leave town.'
82 Id. at 230, 49 N.E. at 769.
83 Id. at 229.
84 Id. at 231, 49 N.E. at 770.
85 See Witcher v. Jones, 17 N.Y. Supp. 491 (C.P. 1892), aff'd on opinion below, 137
N.Y. 599, 33 N.E. 743 (1893).
86 See Gorham v. Ives, 2 Wend. 534 (N.Y. 1829); Mott v. Comstock, 7 Cow. 654 (N.Y.
1827); Chapman v. Smith, 13 Johns. 77 (N.Y. 1816); Crandall v. Jacob, 22 App. Div.
400, 48 N.Y. Supp. 279 (2d Dep't 1897); Gideon v. Dwyer, 87 Hun 246, 33 N.Y. Supp.
754 (Gen. Term, 1st Dep't 1895); Cf. Andrews v. Woodmansee, 15 Wend. 232 (N.Y. 1836);
Hatfield v. Sisson, 28 Misc. 255, 59 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1899); Nealon
v. Frisbie, 11 Misc. 12, 31 N.Y. Supp. 856 (Super. Ct. N.Y. City 1895); Havemeyer v.
Fuller, 60 How. Prac. 316, 10 Abb. N.C. 9 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1881); Bonner v. McPhail, 31
Barb. 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 1860). See note 17 supra (discussion of "reference
test" and "relation test").
87 87 Hun 246, 33 N.Y. Supp. 754 (Gen. Term, 1st Dep't 1895).
88 Id. at 248, 33 N.Y. Supp. at 755.
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These words alone are clearly not within any of the categories of
slander per se. However, the plaintiff alleged the extrinsic facts that
he was the owner and breeder of thoroughbred horses for racing purposes
and that his business was the selling and racing of such horses. He
further alleged that since nearly all racing associations were centrally
controlled, any owner involved in fraudulent practices would be precluded from entering his horses in races anywhere. In upholding (2-1)
the complaint against a demurrer on the ground that the words were
not actionable per se and no special damages were alleged, the Court
89
said:
'The defamatory words were not confined to the plaintiff's character as a
sportsman. They also charged him with the commission of turf frauds.
Now it is distinctly averred that the plaintiff is engaged in the business
of raising and selling horses, and of entering and running horses in races
lawfully conducted. . . .To say of such a man that he had committed
turf frauds, and that he was warned off the turf for crooked practices
thereon, is clearly to defame him in the business thus set out. They tended
to prejudice him therein....'
O'CONNELL CASE
With the above as background, the O'Connell case9 ° can be seen in
clearer perspective.
The action was based on a news article printed in defendant's two
newspapers. The article dealt with the trial of certain minor officials
of the Sugar Trust for participation in the fraudulent weighing of sugar
whereby the import duties were avoided. It also referred to the simultaneous presentation of evidence to a grand jury for the purpose of
indicting men higher up. One article contained the following: 91
'FRAUD INDICTMENT NEAR FOR OFFICER OF SUGAR TRUST.
FEDERAL GRAND JURY HAS EVIDENCE, GAINED FROM MEN
NOW ON TRIAL, IMPLICATING HIM IN WEIGHING TRICKERY.
ONE WITNESS IS INVENTOR OF "CORSET STEEL" SPRING.
WEIGHER TESTIFIES THAT SPITZER TOLD HIM TO "SEE BENDERNAGEL AND GET AN ENVELOPE.'
'The December Grand Jury also examined a witness named O'Connell,
who has not appeared in the criminal trial. It is said he testified to having
invented the corset steel spring device and to having shown it to an official
of the trust, who referred him to Oliver Spitzer, dock superintendent....
'Another witness was Harvey E. Miller of the Fairbanks Scale Company,
who testified that in his opinion the scales used on the sugar piers had
89 Id. at 250, 33 N.Y. Supp. at 756. See note 17 supra (discussion of "reference test" and
"relation test").
90 214 N.Y.352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
91 Id. at 355, 355-57, 108 N.E. at 556.
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been changed since they were bought. In examining them, he says he
found bolt holes showing that the scales originally had a longer beam than
they had when the spring was used .... '
The plaintiff pleaded the offensive articles in their entirety, an inducement referring to the provisions of various federal criminal statutes,
and an innuendo that both amounted to a charge of criminal conduct.
The lower courts upheld the complaint on the ground that the articles
fairly charged plaintiff with an offense against the statutes cited.9
In the Court of Appeals, the defendant urged that:9 3 (1) The matters
of inducement set forth in the complaint could not make out a cause
of action for libel unless there were at the same time proper allegation
of special damage, citing TOWNSHEND ON SLANDER AND LIBEL, Van
Heusen v. Argenteau, Crashley v. PressPublishing Co., and McNamara v.
Goldan; and (2) Neither publication, in any meaning which could be
perceived from the article itself, charged the plaintiff with committing
a crime nor did either make any other statements that could be regarded
as defamatory. As previously discussed, none of the cases cited supports the first proposition. Nor do the citations to Townshend.9 4 The
Court of Appeals (4-3) reversed: 95
The appellant asserts that either publication is not a libel per se or
upon its face, and if a libel, is so only by reason of the facts extrinsic to it
and alleged in the complaint, and the complaint does not allege that the
publication caused the respondent special damage. The appellant then
invokes the established rules of law that (a) a publisher of a libel not
defamatory upon its face, and defamatory by virtue of extrinsic facts is
liable only for the pecuniary damage which legally resulted from the
publication, and (b) the facts showing such damage must be fully and
specifically set forth in the complaint. General allegations of damage
are not sufficient. [Citing Bassell v. Elmore; Stone v. Cooper; Crashley
v. Press Publishing Co.; McNamara v. Goldan.] Indisputably, the present
complaint contains only general allegations of damage. Therefore, we
must determine whether or not the publication in and of itself was libelous.
The innuendoes of the complaint seek to give the language of the publication a broader application, but improperly and ineffectually, because
it is not the office of the innuendo to graft a meaning upon or enlarge the
92 155 App. Div. 918, 140 N.Y. Supp. 1134 (2d Dep't 1913).
93 214 N.Y. 352, 353, 108 N.E. 556, 557 (1915).
94 Townshend, Slander and Libel §§ 308, 345 (4th ed. 1890). Section 308 of Townshend
deals with the necessity of alleging extrinsic matter when the defamatory character of the
words depends on it, using the terms "per se" and "actionable per se." Section 345 contains
the following:
Where the language is actionable per se, special damage need not be alleged; but if the
language is not actionable per se, special damage must be alleged.
Since Townshend earlier defines the term "actionable per se" in its traditional sense, viz.,
words actionable per se are those on which an action can be brought without a showing
of special damage (§§ 157 et seq.), Townshend's statement in § 345 is a mere truism.
95 214 N.Y. 352, 358, 360, 108 N.E. 556, 557, 558 (1915).
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matter set forth, but to explain the application of the words used. The
allegations of extrinsic facts do not enter into the discussion for the reason
that if the defamatory matter is actionable per se, no inducement or
averment of extrinsic facts is necessary. The publication does not charge
the plaintiff with a crime or expose him to contempt, ridicule or disgrace.
The invention of a device which may be used for criminal purposes and
the showing of it to a person in whose business it might be so used and
the fact that he did use it, do not, within reasonable and fair contemplation
or understanding, tend to incriminate or disgrace the inventor. The
plaintiff was not charged by the publication with an illegal or immoral
act or exposed to contempt, ridicule or disgrace.
It is rather difficult to determine the extrinsic facts to which the
Court alludes. In the record on appeal the defendant refers to the
following extrinsic facts: 96 (1) the employment of the plaintiff by the
Sugar Trust; (2) the function of the corset steel spring device; and
(3) the federal statutes. Neither the fact that plaintiff was an employee
of the Sugar Trust nor the function of the spring renders the published
matter defamatory. Federal statutes, being quite a different matter
from foreign law such as a statute of Brazil, as in the Crashley case,
certainly cannot be considered extrinsic facts. Special Term recognized
this when it remarked that federal statutes could be judicially noticed
and were, therefore, of no different status than a criminal statute of
New York, which has never been treated as an extrinsic fact." It would
certainly seem that federal statutes are quite clearly as susceptible of
judicial notice as the reputation of "Coney Island concert halls" was
in the Gates case.
Thus in the O'Connell case, the actual holding was that the published
matter, together with such extrinsic facts as were alleged, neither was
reasonably capable of only a defamatory meaning nor supported the
innuendoes that the plaintiff had violated a criminal statute or done
something disgraceful. Otherwise the sentence in the opinion that the
"innuendoes of the complaint seek to give the language . . . a broader
application . . .,,98 has no significance. The same is true of the Court's
statement that the invention of a device which can be used for criminal
purposes and the showing of it to one who does so use it does not
"within reasonable and fair contemplation or understanding, tend to
incriminate or disgrace the inventor.""9
Uttered as dictum and unsupported by previous holdings of the New
York courts, the "rule" of the O'Connell case, whatever it might mean,
96 Record, if. 9; 11-12, 15-17, 19-23, 33-37, 44-45, Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6, O'Connell
v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
97 77 Misc. 3, 12, 137 N.Y. Supp. 332, 336 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1912). See N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 344-a.
98 214 N.Y. 360, 108 N.E. 558 (1915).
99 Ibid.
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however, has persisted. Broadly stated, the "rule" requires special
damage whenever published matter is not libelous on its face, but becomes defamatory by reference to extrinsic fact. So stated, the "rule"
is inconsistent with the traditional principle that all defamation classifiable as libel is actionable without special damage, and since special
damage was never required when extrinsic facts were necessary to bring
published matter classifiable as slander within one of the four categories
of slander per se, violative of the well-settled maxim that "Written
words are libellous in all cases where, if spoken, they would be
actionable ...."I"
COURT OF APPEALS CASES SUBSEQUENT TO O'CONNELL CASE

Nevertheless, the "rule" of the O'Connell case still must be reckoned
with, for the New York Court of Appeals has never expressly overruled it, although presented with the opportunity to do so on several
occasions since 1915.
In Smith v. Smith, 10 1 the complaint, without alleging special damages,
stated: 10
[T]hat on June 18, 1921, the defendant filed in the office of the city clerk
of the city of New York a sworn application for a marriage license which
contained the following matter alleged to have been libelous: 'Number of
marriage, 1; is applicant a divorced person, No;' that this affidavit became
a public record and the details thereof were published to the world in
various newpapers; that defendant thereby intended to mean that the
intended marriage was the first marriage; that he had never been married
to the plaintiff and had never been divorced from her; that the plaintiff
had never been his wife and that during the time she lived with him she
had been living with him as his mistress with a meretricious relationship.
Although the published matter mentioned neither the plaintiff nor her
former marital status, the Court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action. In other words, special damage was not required where
the extrinsic fact of plaintiff's prior marital status as wife of the defendant was necessary not only for application but to render the published matter capable of being construed only in a defamatory sense
as an imputation of unchastity.
In Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.,10 3 the plain100 Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 204, 23 N.E. 1127, 1128 (1890); Weston v. Weston,
83 App. Div. 520, 523, 82 N.Y. Supp. 351, 353 (4th Dep't 1903); Simpson v. Press Publishing Co., 33 Misc. 228, 229, 67 N.Y. Supp. 401, 402 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1900). See also
Kindley v Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E.2d 660 (1954); Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio
St. 574, 3§ N.E.2d 584 (1941).
101 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923).
102 Ibid. But see Solotaire v. Cowles, 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1951).
103 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926), 44 A.L.R. 1419, 11 Cornell L.Q. 568 (1926), 40
Harv.L. Rev. 323 (1926), 25 Mich. L. Rev. 551 (1927), 35 Yale LJ. 1021 (1926).
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tiff, Mrs. Doris Keane Sydney, a well-known actress, without alleging
special damage, complained of the following words which appeared with
10 4
her picture:
'Doris Keane is, according to rumor, "Fatty" Arbuckle's latest lady love.
Doris is pretty and "Fatty" is cross, or was when some of those prying
newspapermen attempted to interview him about the reported match.'
'Maybe Roscoe ("Fatty") Arbuckle is going to marry Doris Keane and
maybe he is not.'
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged, inter alia, the extrinsic fact that she
was a married woman.
The lower courts granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 05 In the Court of Appeals, the defendant urged that if the
words were not libelous per se, special damages must be pleaded, that
the Court would not go beyond the words themselves to determine
whether they were libelous per se, and that the article nowhere mentioned that plaintiff was a married woman.'0 6 The Court of Appeals
(4-2) reversed, citing the O'Connell case for the proposition that "As
no special damage was pleaded, the plaintiff can only maintain her complaint, which alleged all the above facts by establishing that this article
is libelous per se."'10
The Court then pointed out that to say of a married woman that
she is another man's latest lady love and that there is a reported agreement between them to marry cannot help but have the tendency to disgrace her and that such a publication is libelous per se:10 8
It has been suggested that this article says nothing about Doris Keane
being married. This is true. Neither does it say she is alive, or of age,
or a woman capable of being married. It speaks of Doris Keane and gives
her picture. This draws with it all that Doris Keane is-her standing, her
position in society, and her relationship in life....
Again, no special damage was required where the extrinsic facts, by
supplying the plaintiff's marital status, rendered published matter non104 Id. at 211, 151 N.E. at 209, 44 A.L.R. at 1421.

215 App. Div. 653, 211 N.Y. Supp. 899 (1st Dep't 1925).
242 N.Y. 208, 213, 151 N.E. 209, 211 (1926).
Id. at 211, 151 N.E. at 210, 44 A.L.R. at 1421. Pound, J., and Hiscock, Ch. J., dissented on the ground that the article was not defamatory on its face but could be defamatory
only on the basis of the extrinsic facts that the plaintiff was a married woman or that
"Fatty" Arbuckle was a notorious lover, and that libel-by-extrinsic-fact was, by the "well
established" rule, actionable only on a showing of special damage, adding that if "the court
were prepared to take judicial notice of the bad reputation of Fatty Arbuckle, the case
might be brought under the rule of the Gates Case (155 N.Y. 228), where the then bad
character of Coney Island dance halls was recognized." 242 N.Y. 208, 216, 151 N.E. 209,
211 (1926).
108 Id. at 213, 151 N.E. at 210, 44 A.L.R. at 1422. See Spector v. News Syndicate Co.,
280 N.Y. 346, 21 N.E.2d 185 (1939).
105
106
107
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defamatory on its face, capable of only a defamatory construction,
viz., imputation of unchastity.
In Henry v. New York Post, Inc.,10 9 the defendant had reported that
one Reuter was being sued for separation by his wife, the former musical
comedy star, Louise Henry, who charged that "her husband's brutalities
wrecked the health of their son, Robert, seven. . .

."

The article was

accompanied by the plaintiff's picture. The plaintiff alleged that she
was not and never had been married to Reuter or cohabited with him or
borne him a child, but alleged no special damage. The defendant urged
that the charge of the trial court that the words were libelous was
erroneous. The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Here, again, special damage was not required where the
extrinsic fact relating to the plaintiff's marital status made the published matter clearly defamatory by imputing unchastity.
Although in none of these three cases did the Court of Appeals choose
to overrule the "rule" of the O'Connell case, the Court clearly revealed
that the rule was narrower than originally enunciated. The three cases
established, at least, that when the extrinsic facts dealt with the plaintiff's marital status and when the published matter together with such
facts amounted to the clearly defamatory charge of lack of chastity,
special damage was not required.
In Braun v. Armour & Co.,'" the defendant published an advertisement purporting to set forth the names of dealers in its meat products
and stating "'These progressive dealers listed here sell Armours Star
Bacon in the new window-top carton.' """ Included in the list of dealers
were the plaintiff's name and the address of his market. The plaintiff sued
for libel alleging in his complaint that he was a dealer in solely kosher
meat products in keeping with the tenets of the Orthodox Jewish faith
and that bacon was a nonkosher meat product. No special damage was
22
alleged. The lower courts denied the defendant's motion to dismiss."
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the question was certified: "Does
the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?" The
Court of Appeals, holding that the complaint stated a cause of action,
affirmed.
109 280 N.Y. 842, 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939); see also Rovira v. Boget, 240 N.Y. 314, 148
N.E. 534 (1925).
110 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930).
Ill Id. at 515, 173 N.E. at 845. Cf. Kleeberg v. Sipser, 265 N.Y. 87, 191 N.E. 845 (1934);
Blake v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n, 229 N.Y. 515, 129 N.E. 897 (1920). See also
Cohen v. Eisenberg, 173 Misc. 1089, 19 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940), aff'd
without opinion, 260 App. Div. 1014, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1st Dep't 1940), motion for leave
to appeal and for rehearing denied, 261 App. Div. 890, 25 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1st Dep't 1941)
(oral statement in kosher meat market that non-kosher goods were sold held to constitute
slander per se). See note 17 supra.
112 228 App. Div. 630, 237 N.Y. Supp. 733 (2d Dep't 1929).
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Again the Court of Appeals rejected an opportunity to discredit the
"rule" of the O'Connell case, but instead further narrowed its application. It was now clear that special damage was not necessary where the
extrinsic facts bore on the plaintiff's business (the fact of plaintiff's
status as a kosher meat dealer and the fact, probably sufficiently wellknown to be deserving of judicial notice, that bacon is a nonkosher meat
product) and made the published matter clearly defamatory as tending to injure one in one's calling.
In Ben-Oliel v. Press PublishingCo.," 3 decided the year before Braun
v. Armour & Co., plaintiff, a professional lecturer holding herself out
as an authority on Palestine, sued for libel. The basis for her action
was an article dealing with Palestinian marriage customs published by
the defendants and falsely represented as being written by her. The
plaintiff claimed that her reputation was injured because the article
purported to set forth scientific facts and considered opinions concernning Palestine which were falsely represented, that such customs never
existed and because anyone with knowledge of Palestine would recognize the specious nature of the article and conclude that the plaintiff
was a charlatan. There was no allegation of special damage.
The defendant, relying upon the O'Connell, Crashley, and Van Heusen
cases, was successful in having the complaint dismissed in the lower
courts." 4
The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed: 115
The statement of these facts as coming from a skilled traveler and
observer makes her out ridiculous, a fraud, a deceiver and a charlatan.
Everybody acquainted with life in Palestine knows that such customs do
not and have not existed, and that the plaintiff, who represents herself in
her profession as being historically accurate and learned on these subjects, is ignorant as well as stupid. In other words, the complaint alleges
that the plaintiff makes her livelihood through her reputation as a writer
and lecturer on the life in Palestine under the Mosaic law; that the
113 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929), 7 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 542 (1929). See also Clevenger
v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1960); D'Altamonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y. Supp. 200 (1st Dep't 1913),
modified on other grounds without opinion, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913); Locke
v. Benton & Bowles, 165 Misc. 631, 1 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1937), rev'd,
253 App. Div. 369, 2 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1st Dep't 1938); Gershwin v. Ethical Publishing Co.,
166 Misc. 39, 1 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937); Note, "False Imputation of Authorship," 72 U.S.L. Rev. 481 (1938); Wigmore, "The Right Against False Attribution of
Belief or Utterance," 4 Ky. L.J., No. 8, p. 3 (1916). Cf. Macri v. Mayer, 22 Misc. 2d 429,
201 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960) (crediting authorship of successful advertising slogan by plaintiff to another held not actionable per se).
114 217 App. Div. 743, 216 N.Y. Supp. 801 (1st Dep't 1929).
115 251 N.Y. 250, 254-55, 167 N.E. 432, 433 (1929). Compare Gates v. New York Recorder Co., supra note 81 (reputation of Coney Island concert halls); D'Altamonte v. New
York Herald Co., supra note 100 (African customs) with Crashey v. Press Publishing Co.,
supra note 55 (statutes of Brazil). But cf. O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 90
(federal criminal statutes).
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defendant has falsely printed an article by her which makes her out a
deceiver, a falsifier, and holds her up to ridicule and derision in the eyes
of all those in any way acquainted with the land, its people and its past.
Here the controlling extrinsic facts did not deal with the plaintiff's
marital status or, except to spell out what was already inferrible from
her imputed authorship of the article, her professional status. Nor were
the marriage customs of Palestine so widely known as to be the subject of judicial notice. Yet special damage was not required. The published matter and extrinsic facts, however, were capable of only a defamatory meaning-unfitness for one's calling.
Again in 1945 the Court of Appeals was presented with the opportunity to clarify the libel-by-extrinsic-fact rule in Balabanoff v. Hearst
Consol. Publications, Inc."' The defendant had published an article
7
which contained the following:"
'Mussolini found haven in Lausanne and a job sweeping out the Cafe
le Lion d'0r, hangout for Russian revolutionaries, then headed by
Angelica Balabanoff, who was later to become Secretary to the dread
Cheka.'
The plaintiff, without alleging special damage, asserted in her complaint: that the defendants and the public generally understood that
the word "Che-ka" was formed from the initials of the Russian words
"Extraordinary Commission" which organization was formed in 1917
to crush any counterrevolutionary forces in Russia; that its activities
extended to summary arrest, judgment, and execution; and that "the
very name 'Cheka' became a word of terror, and . . .that its officers
and leaders were looked at askance, with distrust, apprehension, contumely, scorn, fear, resentment and vengeance ....)2118
Special Term refused to dismiss the complaint, but this refusal was
reversed by the Appellate Division." 9 In the Court of Appeals, the
defendant argued that the words were not libelous apart from the extrinsic facts alleged, in which case special damages were required to
sustain the complaint. 20 In reversing the Appellate Division and upholding the complaint, the Court of Appeals said: 121
Concededly, the plaintiff has alleged no special damage. This, however, is not fatal as it is well established that a complaint in a libel
action is sufficient if the false publication complained of is libelous per se.
[Citing Sydney v. MacJadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.; O'Connell v.
Press Publishing Co.]
116 294
117 Id.
118 Id.
19 268
120 294
121 Id.

N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945).
at 353, 62 N.E.2d at 599.
at 353-54, 62 N.E.2d at 600.
App. Div. 1040, 52 N.Y.S.2d 325 (2d Dep't 1945).
N.Y. 351, 352, 62 N.E.2d 599, 600 (1945).
at 354-56, 62 N.E.2d at 600-01.
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The test applicable to the sufficiency of the complaint narrows down
then to the single proposition of whether the publication complained of
is libelous per se.
The article in question goes much further than merely charging appellant with having been an officer or agent of a foreign government. She
is charged with association with Mussolini in a hangout for Russian
revolutionaries, headed by her, as well as later becoming secretary to
the dread 'Cheka.'
The allegations of the complaint describing the organization, functions
and practices of the 'Cheka' are essential to an understanding of the
significance of the language of the subject publication and do not, in
our opinion, constitute extrinsic facts of such a character as to necessitate
allegations of special damage.
Given a fair reading, we feel that the article in question, taken in its
entirety, fairly raises a question as to whether the plaintiff was held up
to public contempt and disgrace; and, if so found, such an article is
libelous per se without alleging special damages.
Whether the false publication in the instant case, in and of itself, is
sufficient to bring the plaintiff into disrepute and subject her to the
hatred and contempt of her friends and associates is a matter within the
province of the jury, and we are unwilling to say, as a matter of law,
that the language used is not libelous per se.
The statements in the opinion that the allegations in the complaint
concerning the "Cheka" were essential to understanding the language
of the published matter and that such allegations did not constitute
extrinsic facts of such a character as to require special damage are
somewhat ambiguous. A possible explanation is that the Court thought
that such facts were sufficiently well-known to be entitled to judicial
notice and that such allegations constituted an innuendo rather than
an inducement. In any event, the actual holding is found in the final
paragraphs of the opinion and is to the effect that the published matter
"in and of itself" (by charging the plaintiff with having associated with
Mussolini in a hangout for Russian revolutionaries, headed by her, and
her later having become secretary to the dread "Cheka") was reasonably
capable of defamatory meaning and therefore presented a question for
the jury. This, then, was a case, in which extrinsic facts were not
essential to the statement of a cause of action.
Since 1945, the Court of Appeals has decided no libel-by-extrinsicfact case. In only three cases since 1945 has the Court even122cited the
O'Connell case and then only in support of other principles.
122 Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d
602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961) (concluding that complaint alleging making of statement which
was libelous per se as to plaintiff corporation within the settled rule that makes the pleading
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RESTATEMENT OF NEW YORK RULE

In no libel-by-extrinsic-fact case has the New York Court of Appeals
actually dismissed a libel-by-extrinsic-fact complaint for failure to
allege special damage. On the other hand, the O'Connell case has been
often cited prior to 1945 and thrice since, and never overruled, by the
Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, subsequent holdings by that Court
have substantially restricted the broad language in the O'Connell opinion
suggesting that special damage is required whenever extrinsic fact is
necessary to render published matter defamatory. Therefore, the
O'Connell rule must mean something less than requiring special damage
in every case of libel-by-extrinsic-fact.
One obvious approach is to take the opposite extreme and to treat
the O'Connell rule as dictum which has never been applied by the
Court of Appeals and to dismiss it completely.' 23 Under such an approach, any written publication which is defamatory, either on its face
or by reference to extrinsic fact, would be actionable without special
damage. 2 4 Such an approach ignores the fact that the O'Connell case
frequently has been cited respectfully by the Court of Appeals and
applied, in one way or another, by the lower New York courts.
Another approach has been to suggest that the New York libel-by"
of special damages unnecessary when the 'language as a whole considered in its ordinary
meaning, naturally and proximately was so injurious to the plaintiff that the court will
presume without any proof that his reputation or credit has been thereby injured,"' citing
O'Connell case); Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 134, 155 N.E.2d 853, 182 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1959) (4-3) (citing O'Connell case as to function of innuendo); Macy v. New York
World-Telegram Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 416, 141 N.E.2d 566, 161 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1957) (4-3) (dissenting opinion citing O'Connell case that to "establish his prima facie case [plaintiff] did
not have to prove that he had been falsely accused of crime, but merely that the article
tended naturally and proximately to disgrace him and hold him up to ridicule and contempt"). The New York law has been characterized as doubtful. Smith & Prosser, Cases
on Torts 1064 (2d ed. 1957). See also 1 Harper & James, Torts 373, n. 8, 9 (1956) ; Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 890 n. 96 (1956):
In New York . . . two inconsistent court of appeals definitions apparently coexist.
Compare O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915), with
Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209
(1926). The lower courts seem to have chosen whichever line of authority they prefer.
Compare S & R Motors, Inc. v. Gowens Motors, Inc., 139 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct.
1955), with de Figuerola v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 189 Misc. 840, 74 N.Y.S.2d
449 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The court of appeals seems oblivious to the confusion, citing both
definitions in a single case. See Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294
N.Y. 351, 354, 62 N.E.2d 599, 600 (1945).
Seelman in his text, The Law of Libel and Slander in the State of New York, ch. H (1933),
concludes that the rule of the O'Connell case was a clear case of judicial error, by a
sharply-divided court, without prior support, and not subsequently followed by the Court
of Appeals, which should be corrected by the Court of Appeals. However, in a later supplement, Seelman refers to the O'Connell case as still the law of New York. Id. Par. 45
(Supp. 1960).
123 Kuhn v. Veloz, 162 Misc. 948, 296 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1937),
rev'd, 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y. Supp. 924 (1st Dep't 1937), 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 250
(1937); Newman v. Reinhardt, 133 N.Y.L.J. No. 125, p. 3, col. 6-7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
195S).
124 See 3 Restatement, Torts § 569 (1938).
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extrinsic-fact cases can be divided into those where the extrinsic fact
related to the plaintiff's status and those where the extrinsic fact related
to circumstances other than the plaintiff's status, with only the latter
requiring special damage.' 25 Although this distinction does tend to
explain the Smith, Sydney, Blake, and Braun cases (assuming that in
the latter case judicial notice could be taken of the fact that bacon is
nonkosher), it does not fit the Ben-Oliel case at all. This approach can
hardly be said to have been accepted as such by the New York lower
courts. 2

6

Still another approach is to require special damage not only in cases
of libel-by-extrinsic-fact, but also in cases where an innuendo is required. This approach tends to confuse the innuendo and inducement
and to follow the line of cases which use the term, defamatory "on its
face," in its broader sense as denoting published matter which is defamatory without either assignment of meaning by innuendo or reference
to extrinsic fact by inducement, rather than in the stricter sense of
denoting published matter which is defamatory without reference to
extrinsic fact by inducement.

27

A final approach, which is consistent with the actual holdings of the
Court of Appeals subsequent to the O'Connell case would be to require
special damage only when the published matter and extrinsic fact
alleged in the inducement did not amount to an imputation which, if
classifiable as slander, would fit within one of the four categories of
slander per se. 28 This approach reconciles all of the Court of Appeals
125 See Polikoff, Book Review, 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125 (1935); Carter and Hughes, Defamation Actions, 15-16 (P.L.I. 1957). See notes 17 and 43 supra.
126 Tower v. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N.Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dep't 1925); Rodger
v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 131 Misc. 312, 226 N.Y. Supp. 451 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1928), 21 Miss. L.J. 422 (1950), 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 416 (1950), 27 N.D.L. Rev. 61 (1951),
3 Okla. L. Rev. 446 (1950), 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 618 (1950), 36 Va. L. Rev. 402 (1950). But
see John-Fredericks, Inc. v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 269 App. Div. 693, 53 N.Y.S.2d 658
(2d Dep't 1945), reversing 39 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1942); Harrison v.
Winchell, 207 Misc. 275, 137 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955) ; Ferrand v. Brooklyn
Daily Eagle, 90 N.Y.L.J. 2100, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1933), aff'd mem., 241 App.
Div. 752, 270 N.Y. Supp. 966 (2d Dep't 1934).
127 Tanzer v. Crowley, 240 App. Div. 203, 268 N.Y. Supp. 620 (4th Dep't 1934); Sweet
v. Ken, Inc., 169 Misc. 407, 7 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938); see also Davis
v. Kelly, 172 App. Div. 171, 158 N.Y. Supp. 145 (1st Dep't 1916). See note 135 infra.
128 Dean Prosser suggested this distinction in 1955. Prosser, Torts 588 (2d ed. 1955).
More recently, he has urged that this is the prevailing American rule. See note 11 supra.
Dean Prosser states that two New York Court of Appeals decisions have held libel per
quod to be actionable per se, citing the Sydney and Smith cases, but that earlier Court of
Appeals cases have held to the contrary, citing the O'Connell, McNamara, and Crashley
cases. He adds that the lower courts have consistently followed the O'Connell case and
probably represent the present New York law which, he concludes, assimilates libel-byextrinsic-fact to slander. Prosser "Libel Per Quod," 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 846, n.48 (1960).
The present author has concluded that the holdings of the Court of Appeals are consistent
with the assimilation of libel-by-extrinsic-fact to slander, but that the New York lower
courts tend to require special damage in all cases of libel-by-extrinsic-fact. See also note 17
supra.
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cases: the Smith, Sydney, Henry, and Blake cases as involving imputations of unchastity, and the Braun and Ben-Oliel cases as involving
imputations of unfitness for one's calling. The Balabanoff case, like
the pre-1915 Gates case, can be distinguished as involving facts capable
of judicial notice and therefore not involving libel-by-extrinsic-fact at all.
SUBSEQUENT NEW YORK LOWER COURT CASES

While doubt may be expressed as to the vitality of the O'Connell
case in the Court of Appeals, there is little question of its influence,
erratic as that is, in the New York lower courts.
Some cases cite the O'Connell case for the well-established proposition
that an innuendo is strictly limited to explaining equivocal matter and
can not extend or enlarge such matter;' 29 others cite it for a definition
of libelous per se.'30 Still others rely on it for the "rule" that special
damage is required whenever published matter is not libelous per se.
Sometimes, this is said in the sense that where extrinsic facts are required, so also are special damages; 131 other times it is not.1 32
129 Growman v. Globe Apartments, Inc., 283 App. Div. 1050, 131 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1st
Dep't 1954); Stevens v. Whelan, 234 App. Div. 118, 254 N.Y. Supp. 272 (1st Dep't 1931);
Samson United Corp. v. Dover Mfg. Co., 233 App. Div. 155, 251 N.Y. Supp. 466 (4th
Dep't 1931); Kloor v. New York Herald Co., 200 App. Div. 90, 192 N.Y. Supp. 465 (2d
Dep't 1922); Feely v. Vitagraph Co., 184 App. Div. 527, 172 N.Y. Supp. 264 (2d Dep't
1918); National Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Curtis Publishing Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d
920 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); Waldron v. Time, Inc., 83 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1948), 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 162 (1949); Siegel v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n,
130 Misc. 18, 223 N.Y. Supp. 549. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1927); Hills v. Press Co., 122
Misc. 212, 202 N.Y. Supp. 678 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1924).
130 Tower v. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N.Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dep't 1925); Kloor
v. New York Herald Co., 200 App. Div. 90, 192 N.Y. Supp. 465 (2d Dep't 1922).
131 Frawley Chem. Corp. v. A. P. Larson Co., 274 App. Div. 643, 86 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Ist
Dep't 1949); Kuhn v. Veloz, 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y. Supp. 924 (1st Dep't 1937),
reversing 162 Misc. 948, 296 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1937); Brodek v. Jones,
212 App. Div. 247, 208 N.Y. Supp. 699 (1st Dep't 1925); Toal v. Zito, 11 Misc. 2d 260,
171 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958); Solotaire v. Cowles Magazines, Inc.,
107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1951); Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc.,
190 Misc. 730, 75 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947); Harry Lee Publishing Co.
v. Riverhead News, Inc., 180 Misc. 211, 40 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1943);
Werstein v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 131 Misc. 763, 227 N.Y. Supp. 729 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1928); Rodger v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 131 Misc. 312, 226 N.Y. Supp. 451 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1928). Only an occasional New York lower court case has held libel-byextrinsic-fact actionable without special damage. John-Fredericks, Inc. v. Abraham &
Strauss, Inc., 269 App. Div. 693, 53 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2d Dep't 1945), reversing 39 N.Y.S.2d
979 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1942); Harrison v. Winchell, 207 Misc. 275, 137 N.Y.S.2d 82
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955); Newman v. Reinhardt, 133 N.Y.L.J., No. 125, p. 3, col. 6-7
(Sup. Ct. County 1955) (third cause of action), aff'd mem., 241 App. Div. 752, 270
N.Y. Supp. 966 (2d Dep't 1934); de Figuerola v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 189 Misc.
840, 74 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); Ferrand v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle,
supra note 126; Brown v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 143 Misc. 199, 255 N.Y. Supp.
403 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1932), aff'd mem., 235 App. Div. 840, 257 N.Y. Supp.
903 (1st Dep't 1932); See also Callahan v. Israels, 140 Misc. 295, 250 N.Y. Supp.
470 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931); Kitograd v. Shapiro, 39 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1943). No Appellate Division case refusing to follow the rule of the O'Connell case,
except the memorandum reversal in John-Fredericks, Inc. v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., supra,
and the affirmances without opinion in Brown v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., supra,
and Newman v. Rheinhardt, supra, has been found. One Supreme Court holding expressly
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Except for a few isolated instances, 133 the lower courts have not consciously distinguished between libel-by-extrinsic-fact cases where the
extrinsic fact related to the plaintiff's status and those where the extrinsic fact related to other circumstances. While some cases happen
to fit such classification, so many cases are contrary that such classification is meaningless.

34

13

In their confusion the lower courts have ignored the one approach
which is consistent with all the Court of Appeals holdings-the assimilation of libel-by-extrinsic-fact to slander.
LIBEL-BY-EXTRINSIC-FACT IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Except for those jurisdictions which follow the traditional rule that
all published matter classifiable as libel is actionable without special
damage,'3 6 the confusion over libel-by-extrinsic-fact is nationwide.
Some jurisdictions are in strict accord with the broad language of
the O'Connell case, requiring special damage whenever the matter is so
published as to be classifiable as libel and is not defamatory except by
reference to extrinsic fact pleaded as inducement. 37 Other jurisdictions
require special damage where both an inducement and an innuendo are
required.'38 Still others extend the special damage requirement beyond
repudiating that rule as no longer law in the light of later appellate decisions was reversed
by the Appellate Division. Kuhn v. Veloz, 162 Misc. 948, 296 N.Y. Supp. 39 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1937), rev'd, 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y. Supp. 924 (1st Dep't 1937). In the
Court of Appeals libel-by-extrinsic-fact cases, the lower courts sometimes required special
damages and other times did not. Thus, in Smith v. Smith, supra note 101, and Henry v.
New York Post, Inc., supra note 109 (marital status cases), and Braun v. Armour & Co.,
supra note 110 (calling case), the plaintiff prevailed in the lower courts. However, in Sidney
v. Macfadden Newspapers Publishing Corp., supra note 103 (marital status case), and
Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 113 (calling case), the defendant prevailed in
the lower courts. In Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., supra note 116 (judicial
notice case), the plaintiff prevailed at special term; the defendant in the Appellate Division.
See Comment, "New York, Libel Per Quod, and Special Damages: An Unresolved Dilemma," 27 Fordham L. Rev. 405 (1958).
132 See, e.g., Hayes v. Van Gelder, 231 App. Div. 663, 248 N.Y. Supp. 393 (1st Dep't
1931); S. & R. Motors, Inc. v. Gowens Motors, Inc., 207 Misc. 890, 139 N.Y.S.2d 212
(Sup. Ct. Orange County 1955).
133 See note 126 supra.
'34 Ibid.
135 While New York has its fair share of cases confusing innuendo and inducement, there
is little judicial authority for the proposition that the special damage requirement applies
to cases requiring an innuendo. Vigoda v. Marchbein, 195 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1959); Richter v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 220, 186
N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), aff'd without opinion, 10 App. Div. 2d 826,
200 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1st Dep't 1960); Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 108,
147 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956), modified on other grounds, 2 App. Div. 2d
18, 153 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1st Dep't 1956) (4-1), aff'd without opinion, 5 N.Y.2d 994, 157
N.E.2d 728, 184 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1959). See note 127 supra and notes 44, 45 infra.
136 See, e.g., Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1916) (statutory
basis); Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 NJ. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (1958).
137 McBride v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 196 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1952); Landstrom
v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951); see also Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 172 F.2d
303, 307, 308 (6th Cir. 1949). See note 42 supra.
138 Sharpe v. Larson, 70 Minn. 209, 72 N.W. 961 (1897).
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libel-by-extrinsic-fact by requiring special damage whenever an innuendo is necessary regardless of whether an inducement is required.' 39
Several jurisdictions are said to assimilate libel-by-extrinsic-fact to
slander. 40 Many cases defy strict classification.
Despite the judicial confusion there has been little statutory clarification. Occasionally, a general statutory definition of libel has been
interpreted as dispensing with any special damage requirement for libelby-extrinsic-fact. 14' California has codified some of the confusion by a
statute requiring special damage whenever the libel is not "defamatory
of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an
inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact. 1

43

England, which is

139 See note 44 supra.
140 Dean Prosser has urged this as the prevailing rule. See note 11 supra. Most of the
cases which Dean Prosser cites in support of the fact that the courts are assimilating libelby-extrinsic-fact to slander do not appear to be in point. Very few of them even involve
libel-by-extrinsic-fact. Some of them say that in determining whether published written
matter is libelous the categories of slander per se provide a guide because whatever, if oral,
would be slanderous per se is, if written, a fortiori, libelous per se. Prosser, "Libel Per
Quod," 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 844, n. 20 (1960). Others hold that where an inducement or
innuendo (or possibly even a colloquium) is required, the matter is not libelous per se. In
various contexts and by using similar terms in various senses, most of them support the
truism that published matter which does not constitute libel per se, or is not libelous per
se, is not actionable per se and therefore requires allegation and proof of special damages.
Neither the present nor proposed Restatement libel-by-extrinsic-fact rule restates prevailing
judicial holdings. A more accurate re-restatement might read:
§ 569. Liability Without Proof of Special Harm.
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without proof of
special harm or loss of reputation if
(a) The publication is made in such a manner as to be classifiable as libel and, is
itself, without reference to extrinsic facts, capable only of a defamatory meaning
(b) The publication is made in such a manner as to be classifiable as slander and
imputes to another
(i) A criminal offense, as stated in § 571,
(ii) A loathsome disease, as stated in § 572,
(iii)
Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office, as stated
in § 573, or

(iv) Unchastity on the part of a woman, as stated in § 574.

(2) One who publishes any other libel or slander is subject to liability only upon
proof of special harm, as stated in § 575.

However, the rule being considered by Dean Prosser makes more sense and appears more
desirable.
141 Schy v. Hearst Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953); Gundram v. Daily
News Publishing Co., 175 Iowa 60, 156 N.W. 840 (1916); McDonald v. Lee, 246 Pa. 253,
92 Atl. 135 (1914); Whitaker v. Sherbrook Distrib. Co., 189 S.C. 243, 200 S.E. 848 (1939);
Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 Utah 74, 83 Pac. 573 (1905).
142 See, e.g., Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1916) (statute
defining criminal libel construed as abolishing special damage requirement for libel-by-extrinsic-fact). Cf. Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S.W. 874 (1912) (statute
defining libel construed as eliminating special damage requirement where libel not per se
because innuendo required).
143 Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 45a (Deering 1960):
A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter,
such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face.
Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff
alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof.
Special damage is defined in Section 48a of this code.
Dean Prosser characterizes this statute as confirming the cases assimilating libel-by-extrinsicfact to slander. However, the statute would appear to require special damage whenever
published matter is not libelous on its face but necessitates explanatory matter, such as an
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generally regarded as following the traditional general rule,144 has
recently provided some protection by statute for publishers who neither
know nor have reasonable grounds for knowing the extrinsic facts necesthe published matter either applicable to the plaintiff or
sary to render
145
defamatory.
CONCLUSION

The present confusion concerning libel-by-extrinsic-fact indicates that
some reform is needed. This may be true of the entire law of defamation,'146 but at least in the other areas of defamation law most of the
rules, while subject to criticism as to their soundness, do not share the
added defect of being practically incomprehensible.
The easy solution of the libel-by-extrinsic-fact difficulties would be to
revert to the traditional rule that all matter so published as to be classifiable as libel is actionable without special damage (without regard to
the necessity of an inducement or an innuendo). This approach would
afford the most substantial protection for a person's reputation, but
would also subject publishers to the highest risks of defamation litigation
and perpetuate the present advantage which libeled persons have over
slandered persons, by renewing the importance of the somewhat artificial
slander-libel distinction.
To a defamed person, it would seem to make little difference whether
the defamatory meaning of a publication depends upon facts included
in the published matter or upon extrinsic facts known to those to whom
the matter is published. Injury to reputation can be as serious in the
one case as the other, and the notoriety of the extrinsic facts among
those to whom the matter is published can be considered by the jury in
assessing damages. 4 '
So far as publishers are concerned, the orthodox view is that they publish at their peril. 1 48

Defamation law traditionally has imposed non-

inducement, innuendo [sic] or other extrinsic fact, to render it defamatory of the plaintiff.
In other words, special damage would be required in every case of libel-by-extrinsic-fact
[see MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959) (5-2)] and
possibly also whenever an innuendo is required [see Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal. App. 2d
581, 126 P.2d 668 (1942)].
144 Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 69 A.L.R. 720.
145 The Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. VI & 1 Eliz. I, c. 66, § 4.
146 For a precis of the principal reform proposals, see Prosser, Torts 595-96 (2d ed.
1955).
147 See Modisette & Adams v. Lorenze, 163 La. 505, 112 So. 397 (1927); Dall v. Time,
Inc., 252 App. Div. 636, 300 N.Y. Supp. 680 (1st Dep't 1937); Developments in the LawDefamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 883-84 (1956).
148 The classic statement is by Holmes, J., in Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189
(1909), quoting the dictum of Chief Justice Mansfield in the criminal libel case of Rex v.
Woodfall, Lofft 776, 781, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (K.B. 1774):
"If the publication was libellous the defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters
by Lord Mansfield, 'Whatever [sic: "Whenever" in original] a man publishes he publishes at his peril' .... .
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fault liability, regardless of intention 149 or negligence. 150 This nonfault liability seems appropriate in the case of media of mass communication, which have such a vast potential of harm to individual reputation; here where corporate publishers have the ability to absorb the
cost of defamation litigation as an inherent business expense, non-fault
liability has more to recommend it than in other cases. But even in
such a case, the application of the traditional rule to a publisher who
neither knows nor has reason to know of the extrinsic facts involved
seems harsh. As mentioned, a statute ameliorating this harsh effect to
some extent has been enacted in England. 5 '
This quotation was cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Corrigan v. BobbsMerrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920).
149 Prosser, Torts 601-04 (2d ed. 1955).
150 Prosser, Torts 604-06 (2d ed. 1955). Where published matter is nondefamatory on
its face and becomes capable of a defamatory meaning only by reference to extrinsic fact,
some authorities hold the publisher liable only when he knew or should have known of
such extrinsic facts. An early New York case ruled, more or less by dictum, that a ibel
complaint charging a false publication that the plaintiff had married a named woman, and
alleging the extrinsic fact that such woman was a public prostitute, should have averred
that such extrinsic fact was known to the defendants at the time of the publication. Caldwell v. Raymond, 2 Abb. Pr. 193, 194, 196, 197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). This case has
been called sui generis. Seelman, The Law of Libel and Slander in the State of New York
37 (1933). A later case, however, avoided the Caldwell v. Raymond dictum, by finding that
the publisher had been negligent in not knowing the extrinsic facts. Morey v. Morning
journal Ass'n, 1 N.Y. Supp. 475, 477 (Gen. Term, 5th Dep't 1888), aff'd, 123 N.Y. 207, 25
N.E. 161 (1890). The subsequent Court of Appeals libel-by-extrinsic-fact cases did not discuss the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the extrinsic facts on the part of the defendant.
In some of them, at least, the defendant presumably had no such knowledge, but some
inquiry might have disclosed such extrinsic facts. See also Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920) (fiction case involving elements of negligence). At least
one subsequent lower court case has cited the Caldwell v. Raymond dictum with apparent
approval. Campbell v. Cunningham Natural Gas Corp., 164 Misc. 1, 6-7, 298 N.Y. Supp.
200, 207 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1937) (Van Voorhis, J.). See Jones v. Polk Co., 190
Ala. 243, 67 So. 577 (1915), 29 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1916) (holding that defendant must
know or be negligent in not knowing defamatory imputation). Lack of negligence of the
publisher in not being aware of the extrinsic facts was held immaterial in the Scottish case
of Morrison v. Ritchie and Co., 4 Sess. Cas. 5th Ser. 645, 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902). A
well-known English case held the publisher liable irrespective of whether he knew or should
have known of the extrinsic fact. Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. [1929) 2 K.B.
331, 17 Calif. L. Rev. 684 (1929) 4 Camb. L.J. 75 (1930), 8 Can. B. Rev. 155 (1930), 18
Geo. L.J. 382 (1930), 25 Ill.
L. Rev. 98 (1930), 64 Ir. L.T. 25 (1930), 14 Minn. L. Rev. 186
(1930), 10 Ore. L. Rev. 194 (1931), 73 Sol. J. 50 (1929), approved by Pollock and criticizedLj
Holdsworth in 46 L.Q. Rev. 1, 133 (1930). It was argued unsuccessfully on - an e, &Cr,-1ictum
[Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 5 C.P.D. 514, 539 (1880)] ths -1 ne extrinsic facts
had to be "known both to the person who wrote the document ,_Urtio the persons to whom
it was published." The court (2-1) held the dicturm-iconsistent with the leading House
of Lords case of Hulton & Co. v. JonesjL-al0l A.C. 20 (Artemus Jones case, which, of
course, involved published matta"ra<affiatory on its face and not libel-by-extrinsic-fact).
Greer, L.J., distinguished Rulton & Co. v. Jones in a vigorous dissent. The harshness of
been ameliorated by statute, supra note 145. One American note
this rule in England lias
writer has questioned whether the Cassidy case would be followed in the United States.
Note, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 98, 99 (1930). It has been suggested that where the published matter
is not defamatory on its face but becomes such by reference to extrinsic facts, the publisher
should not be liable unless he knew such extrinsic facts or was negligent in not knowing
them. See also Notes, 17 Calif. L. Rev. 684 (1929); 29 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 534-36 (1916);
25 Ill. L. Rev. 98, 99 (1930); 22 Jurid. Rev. 254, 259 (1910); 10 Ore. L. Rev. 194, 197
(1931). Contra, 3 Restatement, Torts § 580, comment c (1938). See, generally, Prosser,
Torts § 94 (2d ed. 1955); 1 Harper & James, Torts 363-65 (1956).
151 See note 145 supra.
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The traditional rule, while logically following the slander-libel distinction, does not note that in libel-by-extrinsic-fact, while the matter
may be so published as to be classifiable as libel, the extrinsic facts
which render the matter defamatory are not so published and, to such
extent, resemble slander.'52 Thus, requiring special damage whenever an
inducement is needed to show such extrinsic facts can be justified as a
thorough-going adherence to the libel-slander distinction.
Even less defensible is the imposition of the special damage requirement whenever an innuendo is required, which tends to provide excessive immunity to publishers. Publishers would appear to be protected
sufficiently by the present practice which requires the plaintiff to plead
an innuendo whenever the published matter is reasonably capable of
both defamatory and nondefamatory meanings. If the judge decides
that the innuendo is properly inferrible from the published matter (with
or without reference to pleaded extrinsic fact), it is for the jury to
determine whether those to whom the matter was published understood it according to the meaning assigned by the plaintiff in his innuendo and to assess damages accordingly. 5 ' The jurisdictions defining
"libel per quod" as any matter thus requiring an innuendo and adding
the special damage requirement in this situation have created an extra
pitfall for the injured individual and given the publisher a supernumerary advantage.
The literal application of the broad language of the O'Connell case,
requiring the plaintiff to show special damages in all cases involving
written matter which is only rendered defamatory by reference to
extrinsic facts, leads to other undesirable results. It frequently immunizes publishers, including those who knew or should have known the
extrinsic facts involved; this protection is at the expense of those plaintiffs who are unable to prove specific pecuniary loss, but whose reputations are no less seriously injured in the minds of those who knew
the extriwic facts, regardless of the fact that the extrinsic facts were
not set forth as Part-f the published matter. Furthermore, the O'Connell "rule" creates some wh -f---z- dilemma since it places a greater
burden in "libel-by-extrinsic-fact" cases- than_ in "slander-by-extrinsicfact" cases. Where resort to extrinsic facts is necessary to show that
orally published matter communicates an imputation which is within
one of the four slander per se categories, the plaintiff, as previously dis152 See note 40 supra. Requiring special damage is an overly-cautious way of requiring
proof that some person or persons to whom the published matter was published also knew
the extrinsic facts. See note 147 supra.
153 See notes 35-37 supra. The cases requiring special damage where an innuendo is
pleaded may be groping for evidence that the -persons to whom the published matter was
published actually construed it in a defamatory sense. See note 143 supra.
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cussed, is not required to allege or prove special damage to establish
his cause of action. Therefore, to require special damage in all "libelby-extrinsic-fact" cases, including those involving imputations of serious
crime, loathsome disease, unfitness for one's calling, or unchastity,
violates the maxim that any communication which is actionable if so
published as to be classifiable as slander is, a fortiori, actionable if so
published as to be classifiable as libel.
This dilemma suggests the following proper limitation to any "libelby-extrinsic-fact rule": The plaintiff should be required to allege and
prove special damage only when the published matter and extrinsic
fact taken together amount to an imputation which, if classifiable as
slander, would not be within one of the four slander per se categories.
This limitation reasonably balances the conflicting interests of individual
reputation and freedom of expression, does not violate the "actionableas-slander-a-fortiori-actionable-as-libel" maxim, is consistent with some
court holdings even though the limitation is not articulated in such
opinions, and recognizes that in defamation-by-extrinsic-fact, the slanderlibel distinction, which turns on how the published matter alone is published, supports application of the slander rule.
In effect, any libel-by-extrinsic-fact rule, to the extent that it requires
special damage, can be said to represent: (1) an exception to the
traditional rule of libel, (2) a device to narrow actionable libel, (3) the
establishment of a third subdivision of defamation (in addition to
slander and libel) known as "libel-by-extrinsic-fact," and (4) the
assimilation of libel-by-extrinsic-fact to slander.
The traditional slander-libel distinction has been much criticized,
but those favoring its abolition have disagreed as to whether slander
should be assimilated to libel'5 4 or libel assimilated to slander.1 55 So

long as the distinction does survive, the assimilation of libel-by-extrinsic-fact to slander would appear to be a satisfactory compromise. Realistically restated, this would abolish the libel-by-extrinsic-fact rule
since in the cases so denominated the defamation is made out by the
published matter only by reference to extrinsic fact extraneous to such
matter, such extrinsic fact being classifiable more accurately as slander
than as libel.
"Defamation-by-extrinsic-fact" would be a more apt description.
'54

Paton, "Reform and the English Law of Defamation," 33 I1. L. Rev. 669 (1939). See

note 12 supra.

155 The English Press Union Bill of 1938, which was not passed by Parliament, adopted
an approach much like the assimilation of libel to slander. For a discussion of this, and
other reform proposals, see Donnelly, "The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform,"
33 Minn. L. Rev. 609 (1949); see also Courtney, "Absurdities of the Law of Slander and
Libel," 36 Am. L. Rev. 552 (1902).

